Satellite Televisions in Lebanon: Agents of Change or Reinforcing the Status Quo? by Youssef, Yara
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
ScholarWorks@UARK
Theses and Dissertations
5-2004
Satellite Televisions in Lebanon: Agents of Change
or Reinforcing the Status Quo?
Yara Youssef
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd
Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, Models and Methods Commons, Other Political
Science Commons, and the Political Theory Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact scholar@uark.edu, ccmiddle@uark.edu.
Recommended Citation
Youssef, Yara, "Satellite Televisions in Lebanon: Agents of Change or Reinforcing the Status Quo?" (2004). Theses and Dissertations.
2511.
http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/2511
SA TELLITE  TELEVISIONS IN  LEBAN O N :
AGENTS OF CHANGE OR REINFORCING TH E STA TU S QUO?
SATELLITE TELEVISIONS IN LEBANON:
AGENTS OF CHANGE OR REINFORCING THE STATUS QUO?
A Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment 
Of the requirements for the degree of 
Master o f Arts
By
YARA YOUSSEF, B.A. 
Lebanese American University, 1998
May 2004
University o f Arkansas
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART ONE:
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER I: LITERATURE
1. Communication and Democracy
2. The Notion o f Public Sphere
3. Habermas Critics
4. Studying the Impact o f Television
5. Does Television Entail Democracy?
6. Interactive Media: Beyond Traditional Boundaries
7. The New Public Sphere in Lebanon
CHAPTER II: LEBANESE AN D  AR AB M E D IA  AN D  SATELLITE  HISTORY
1. Lebanon’s “ Special Freedoms”
2. Television as a Private Enterprise
3. Damages o f  the C iv il War
4. The Mushrooming o f Illegal Media Stations
5. The Sectarian Structure o f the Media
6. Satellite Technology in the Arab World
7. Lebanon’s position in the Arab W orld
8. Transition Between War and Satellite
9. A  New Audiovisual Law
10. Satellite Television in Lebanon
PART TWO:
CHAPTER III: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
1. Opposition vs. Government
2. Preserving Lebanon’s Image
3. Indirect Control o f an Uncontrollable Medium
4. Media as a Projection o f Lebanese Affairs
5. Restructuring the Media
CONCLUSION
BIBLIO G R APH Y
APPENDICES
2
9
10
11
13
15
17
18
20
22
23
25
28
31
35
37
41
43
45
49
53
55
59
61
70
72
78
84
87
iv
Introduction
There has been a noted interest in the new technologies of the nineties, those that 
have expanded the realm of traditional mass media and the traditional means o f 
communication that people were previously used to. W ith the start o f globalization and 
the world becoming what some have called “ global village,”  the act of distributing 
information to the four comers o f the world has become less complicated than it used to 
be, and boundaries are seen as constantly being eroded by the new pressures o f 
modernization and liberalization. The internet and satellite televisions increased in 
importance in this realm, and so did the study o f the impact of these means o f 
communication on civil society and governments. The purpose of this study is to observe 
and analyze the impact of the new media, this new public sphere, on civil society and its 
politics, particularly in the case of Lebanon. M y  objective is to understand how the 
dynamics of the New Media and those o f local politics interact and affect each other, and 
consequently to what extent this interaction is encouraging or permitting democratization 
and freedom of speech. In other words, is the New Media affecting the Lebanese 
political discourse? Or is it reinforcing the power o f traditional politicians?
Case Study
In order to achieve this, I build on Habermas’ work on the public sphere o f 
democratic debate, political dialogue, and o f newspapers, journals, pamphlets, and books, 
extending it to the audiovisual realm. Moreover, I  examine the main criticisms o f 
Habermas’ work and observe alternatives and an expansion of his theory. As a result, I 
argue that in contemporary societies, an increase and redefinition of the public sphere is 
taking place because of new technologies and that these developments play an important 
part in our societies, and can possibly shape their development. M y case study focuses
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on Lebanon, questioning who are the real voices behind the new mass media, and in 
particular satellite television? What is their message or function? What are they trying to 
achieve? And how are they putting forward their agenda or free speech? Or are they 
able to promote an agenda in the first place? I analyze the po litica l struggle that these 
institu tions face, and their financial difficulties and subsequent lim itations. Moreover, I 
ask how the growth o f Satellite w ill influence Lebanon and the Arab w orld as a result. 
How  the popularity and accessibility o f satellite television is changing the way the Arabs 
see themselves and the rest o f the world? W ill increased freedom o f information be an 
ind ication o f a new democracy, or is satellite television just a subtle form o f indirect 
control and a governmental distraction? And how do state interests influence the satellite 
channels, or are they actually free o f any political pressures? F inally, I ask whether the 
“ New M edia”  should be looked at as one body o f communication, or whether satellite 
technology should be looked at separately from other means o f communication such as 
the Internet, because o f the structural differences that these two contain.
Methodology
To do this, I look at satellite television stations in Lebanon and their relationship 
w ith  the Lebanese government. I  provide a historical background to base the current 
situation o f these media in Lebanon, as well as its position w ith in  the Arab W orld and the 
regional race towards satellite technology. I look at the different attempts to censor these 
stations, as w ell as their financial and contextual lim itations. I create a longitudinal 
analysis o f the elements o f censorship during the years fo llow ing  the creation o f the new 
audiovisual law until 2004. The major ity o f my research is qualitative, analyzing 
governmental actions towards satellite stations and the resulting change in the content o f
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those stations. I also look at self-censorship and the choices these stations make facing 
governmental pressure. I  utilize my own field interviews as well as relevant literature to 
compile a comprehensive analysis o f these changes. My sources range from newspaper 
coverage and analysis, to books relevant to the study, as well as various specialized 
journal articles, Georgetown University’ s “ Arab Information Project,”  and the online 
Transnational Broadcasting Journal. I also use interviews w ith executives from 
televisions to get a grasp on the strategies and proposed mission of satellite televisions, 
and understand the dynamics between these media and the government.
This study w ill be divided into two main parts, further organized into different 
subdivisions. The first part w ill provide a literature review that discusses satellite 
televisions and the schools o f thought that see it as a new and vibrant Public Sphere or 
otherwise; It also includes a history of media and satellite televisions in Lebanon and the 
Arab world in general, dividing this chapter into regional and thematic subdivisions, and 
comparing Lebanese media with its Arab counterpart, and the latter’ s effect on Lebanese 
satellite television; F inally, the second part consists of a longitudinal analysis o f the latest 
developments that occurred subsequent to the creation of the audiovisual law in 1994 up 
until 2004, and an analysis o f the implementation of the various media laws put in place, 
and the subsequent findings and conclusions one can draw from these events.
Relevant Literature
Freedom o f the press is a basic criterion for determining i f  there is a democracy in 
a country. (Ungar, 1990) For many schools of thought, press freedom is a catalyst of 
other freedoms, a step towards fu ll democratization. Furthermore, it is also seen as one of 
the most important elements needed in order to define a country as democratic. Another
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school of thought, on the other hand, focuses on the ideological role of the systems o f 
communication, and does not take their mere existence in a society at face value. 
Therefore, any consideration of democracy and conflict must begin with an analysis o f 
systems of communication, and a study o f their structure and content. For Raboy and 
Dagenais, “ the media-crisis relationship becomes a key factoring the struggle fo r 
democracy, and media constitute a contested terrain in the struggles surrounding 
conceptualization, definitions and transformation o f society in different parts of the world. 
(Alleyne, 1994)
There has been a wide array o f literature that studies the New Media and the New 
Public Sphere that it supposedly creates, especially in the region of the Middle East. For 
example, one of the most prominent scholars on the subject is Jon Anderson, who studies 
the New Media and places the Internet and satellite television in the context o f other 
"down-market technologies" such as cassettes, leafleting, magazines, and telephones. He 
contrasts these with the "old media," i.e. traditional state monopolies on television, radio 
and newspapers, which are designed to promote nation-building in authoritarian states. 
The old media, in Anderson’s opinion, are known as "state theatres" and have provoked 
suspicion, social aloofness and conspiracy theories among receivers. By contrast, the 
New Media is beginning to de-monopolize the content and understanding of information 
in the Arab world, according to a number o f scholars including Anderson himself. 
Therefore, the common trend in this school o f thought is that “ Down-market”  
information technologies w ill eventually bring a variety o f controversial and important 
issues into every Arabic liv ing room, therefore liberalizing and revolutionizing the 
existing status quo.
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Another school of thought is more pessimistic towards the impact of 
communication technologies. Jon Alterman, for example, cast the information revolution 
in the Arab world in the context of the overall globalization process, and draws a 
distinction between the globalization of information, which erodes censorship and spurs 
the democratization of information, and the globalization of style — the 
"McDonaldization" o f the world — which benefits only the producers of fashionable 
products. While the globalization of information is beneficial in general, it is relatively 
difficult to participate in it effectively due to the overwhelming volume of information 
available, and the limits of ownership that satellite technologies in particular offer. On the 
other hand, participation in the globalization of style is much easier, as it merely requires 
the purchase of a product, such as a subscription for cable or the installation of a dish.
In these terms, Alterman is less optimistic about the spread of information 
technology throughout the Arab world, noting a number o f regional constraints. Limited 
English literacy and a shortage of technical skills and a low GDP per capita in some 
countries are the main obstacles which Alterman expects to restrain IT growth in Arab 
countries, though it is not the case in all Arab countries. Other obstacles include the 
political systems in these Arab countries, mostly ruled by Kings, dictators, and lifelong 
presidents who dread opposing views. Therefore Alterman believes that change starts 
within the society, not through mass media, and also notes how information technology 
can be destabilizing. He hypothesizes that information technologies may further the 
division of the small, “ techno-savvy elites”  from the rest o f a population that lacks 
technology, access, and skills, and increased usage of information technology by
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"cultural authenticity" movements to promote their message, coexist w ith the rise of 
hybrid identities spurred on by information globalization.1
Nabil Dajani further discusses this idea of segmentation and the power o f the elite 
in the Lebanese case in particular: He argues that Lebanese television channels are more 
characteristically tools fo r pursuing sectarian interests in the Lebanese perspective rather 
than furthering a broadly "Lebanese" agenda. This pattern became exaggerated during 
the Lebanese c iv il war and, subsequently, new legislation successfully reduced the 
number of permitted stations. However, Dajani argues, Lebanese television remains a 
tool of sectarian elites and is virtually devoid of programming beneficial for national 
development. Instead, it  is mostly filled with European, Syrian, Egyptian and American 
movies, soap operas and other light entertainment. Dajani furthers his argument even 
more by suggesting that subscriptions to the satellite channels are driven far more by 
entertainment than by po litica l and news programs. Moreover, even w ith the freedom 
some satellite televisions have, the restrictions imposed on them when it comes to 
discussing certain taboo issues are many and further impedes any change possible.
Point of study
Consequently, I argue that broadcast media have produced new public spheres 
and spaces for information, debate, and participation that contain both the potential to 
stimulate democracy and to augment the dissemination of critical ideas, as well as new 
possibilities for manipulation, social control, and the promotion o f pro-govemmental 
positions. The example o f Lebanese satellite televisions is particularly pertinent in view 
of the false image it gives o f a free media with no lim its on its discourse, while the reality 
is different and reaches the extent o f closing down stations as w ell as physical and 
1 Arab Information Project lecture [On-line] www.georgetown.edu/research/arabtech
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psychological threats on journalists. The control that the Lebanese government exercises 
on these means of communication is justified  w ith a number of reasons, mainly internal 
security, Lebanon’s image abroad, and preserving ties with brotherly countries. The 
main powerbroker in this equation is Syria, a country that has been an occupation force 
for some, and a savior for others, fo r more than twenty years. Other powerbrokers 
include Saudi Arabia, which plays a major role in securing and offering investments to 
post-war Lebanon. Some politicians in the Lebanese government also regularly use the 
war with Israel as yet another reason fo r government censorship, and many justifications 
fo r imprisonment and other actions have been justified by the official line “ dealing w ith 
the enemy.”  These elements and other regional considerations turn the Lebanese “ free”  
and “ new” press more of an old medium in a new disguise than a revolutionary process o f 
democratization.
Significance
Actually, the case of Lebanon is important because it combines the two extremes 
the development of new technology in communication could lead to: it could help 
citizens revitalize democracy, or lure them into a surrogate for democratic dialogue. 
There is a fine line between the two, and understanding the Lebanese case is strongly 
relevant to prevent the latter on a wider Arabic level because of its deep history o f media 
development. Lebanon is also an example o f how Arab states use indirect means o f 
control as opposed to obvious means o f repression when the latter means fails to work. 
In other words, Arab governments have gotten used to fight those who are against them 
by follow ing the same tactics that the opposing side does; in effect, it seems that 
governments choose the option of investing in satellite television as a counterattack and
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as a way to allow people to vent without creating much change, instead of having to deal 
with an actual creation of a civil society that promotes national dialogue and the 
possibility of change. Moreover, often in studies scholars have tended to put the internet 
and satellite television within the same category, therefore rendering their significance 
equal in force instead and impact, and not putting enough importance on each medium as 
a unique and different experiment in communication and free speech.
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Chapter 1: Literature
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When the term communication is used, it is often used in close association with
information. This is understandable, because the Latin roots of both words suggest that 
they possess valuable potentialities. It is significant that communication and community 
both share the Latin root communis, meaning common. From this root we got the other 
Latin word communicare, meaning “ to make common to many, share, impart, divide.”  
(Alleyne, 1994) Therefore, inherent to the definition of communication is the idea of 
sharing. And one of the definitions o f community is common character, identity, and 
background. This means communication is essential for the creation of something known 
as a community at both the domestic and international levels. Moreover, communication 
is conceived as a process that must be in place for any distribution of information to 
occur. And, in addition, communication is seen as the medium that promotes the right to 
hold and impart ideas, which is a fundamental principle of any credible democracy.
Communication and Democracy
Communication in modem democracies can be broadly divided into two main 
notions: the first one being that there is the democratized media or participatory media 
that includes the new media such as satellite television and computer-related media and 
can be termed alternative; and the second is that there are social movements and groups 
who use these media actively for social change. (Dahlgren, 1995) Notions o f the public 
sphere first started with Habermas, and have been developed by other researchers such as 
Garnham (1986), Cohen (1985), Curran (1991), Scannel (1989), Blunder (1992), Keane 
(1991), and Tomlinson (1991). These notions have been picked up on by all media and 
political communication researchers studying many regions and aspects o f the public
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sphere. In his milestone book, The Structural Transform ation o f the Public Sphere (1989), 
Habermas develops the normative notion of the public sphere as a part of social life 
where citizens can exchange views on matters o f importance to the common good, so that 
public opinion can be formed. This public sphere comes into being when people gather to 
discuss issues o f political concern.
The Notion of Public Sphere
W ith  the term Public Sphere, I refer to communicative exchanges and relations 
which focus on subjects o f political interest, in which the institutions o f political power 
and the institutions o f mass media mainly, but not solely, interact w ith each other. Public 
sphere, in other words, is where people gather in fo rm a lly  to discuss the formal structures 
of society and government. It is the context where c iv il society flourishes and becomes 
active in critic iz ing and elaborating on the different issues pertaining to the public realm.
For Habermas, the public sphere is "a discursive arena that is home to citizen 
debate, deliberation, agreement and action.”  (V illa , 1992) Habermas' earlier work relies 
on a description o f a historical moment during the 17th and 18th centuries when coffee 
houses, societies and salons became the center o f debate, and he extends these arguments 
to an ideal o f participation in the public sphere in today’ s world. During the era o f the 
Enlightenment and 18th century democratic revolutions, public spheres emerged where 
individuals could discuss and debate issues o f common concern. (Habermas, 1989) 
Habermas argues that a small-scale press is vita l to the development o f a participatory 
public and to related notions o f citizenship. However, because Habermas attributed this
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activity to the merchant middle classes who were literate and com m ercially independent, 
his theory is sometimes referred to as the bourgeois public sphere.
W ith the emergence o f the welfare state in the twentieth century Habermas noted 
the further transformations o f the public sphere. In his view, journa lism ’ s critica l role in 
the wake o f advertising, entertainment, and public relations becomes muted, and public 
opinion is no longer a process o f rational discourse but the result o f pub lic ity  and social 
engineering in the media. Habermas’ analysis is truly ambitious and largely compelling, 
yet there remain some areas o f d ifficu lty  in the point o f view o f many o f his critics. It 
can be argued that even the discourse o f the bourgeois public sphere at its zenith never 
manifested the high level o f reasoned discourse he suggests, and furthermore that the 
situation under advanced capitalism is not as bleak and locked as he asserts.
The other significant public sphere theory comes from  the po litica l scientist 
Hanna Arendt. In her m ajor work, The Human Condition (1958), she offers a critique o f 
the mass society and the loss o f public realm. While Habermas m ain ly analyses the 
modem bourgeois public sphere to develop his normative model, Arendt focuses on the 
public realm in the Greek polis. However, Arendt and Habermas both agree on the loss o f 
distinction between the public and private spheres and the negative effects o f this process 
on public sphere. They both critic ize the mass society, w ith  which they associate the 
decline o f the public sphere and the creation o f an industrialized society where the public 
sphere is controlled by different external factors.
Habermas Critics
In effect, the main critic ism  o f the work o f Habermas is the fact that he lim its  his 
observations to the burgeoning bourgeois atmosphere that culm inated in a very live ly
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bourgeois society. This is why Kluge (1997) argues that the public sphere Habermas 
envisions is just a forum for the bourgeoisie, and that it does not represent all o f 
society. Therefore, Kluge argued fo r the existence of a counter public sphere, which 
includes those that are not part o f the bourgeois public sphere, and thus could not use the 
same medium that the bourgeois have access to. In his theory, there is a public sphere for 
the bourgeois and one for the proletariat, and the existence of a bourgeois public sphere 
with limited access does not mean the emancipation or freedom of expression o f the other 
sections of society. Brecht’s idea o f a many-to-many communication device is an attempt 
to bridge these two theories. Through his device, Bertolt Brecht envisions a way to 
include everyone into the public sphere, and to encourage greater discourse w ith in  the 
exiting limited public sphere, such as coffeehouses.
Habermas's ideas is further argued in Adorno’s (1991) idea of a culture industry: 
Habermas claims that institutions that previously only published news —such as 
newspapers, magazines, radio, and television— have turned into "bearers and leaders o f 
public opinion." In other words, that these media shape the ideas of those who have 
access to them. This sentiment coincides w ith Adorno's belief in a culture industry, in 
which he stipulates that this industry creates images and feeds ideology to the 
masses. Thus, the people who earlier only reported the news, are now creating the news, 
and Habermas may see this as beneficial because it increases discourse w ithin the public 
sphere and promotes dialectic between the different parts o f society, but Adorno argues 
the opposite, saying that this culture industry could only restrict the discussion in the 
public sphere, because it lim its it to those who have the power to use these devices, and 
thus it dictates on those with lesser powers what to think.
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Moreover, these “ centers of debate”  that mass media create, as Habermas
theorized, were at some point important to social movements because they took the form 
o f rational-critical debates, with a set of rules, including avoiding the use of emotion or 
emotive language, and focusing on the rationality o f the content alone. In this context, it 
is the common interest, and the search for the truth, that prevails in the discussions. This 
entails the need for a conscientious media with a responsible and truthful background, not 
one that distorts and uses its powerful effect to promote its own interests. Habermas 
therefore emphasizes the critical role of the media in the public sphere, distinguishing 
between the early press that highlighted political controversy and the more recent 
development o f media, which turn the news into a commodity. Habermas outlines the 
development o f newspapers in the early 17th century, commenting that the press "was for 
the firs t time established as a genuinely critical organ o f a public engaged in critical 
political debate: as the fourth estate." (Habermas, 1989:60)
However, although this might have been the case in England, it was not the norm 
in other countries. And, moreover, many of the old centers o f the public sphere still exist, 
but are mere strongholds for governmental control and nation-building, especially with 
respect to developing countries. Many theorists have commented that television and 
other electronic communications further isolate people from  one another and "substituted 
themselves for older spaces of politics," (Thornton, 1996) instead o f bringing about a 
healthy public sphere for the exchange of ideas. Also, instead o f reporting on politics, the 
media are becoming active participants in the po litica l process through their role in 
publicity, and the selectivity o f news reporting. Increasingly, the media has become 
central to political life  and not only a bearer o f truth fo r the common good.
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Nevertheless, public debate on television and in newspapers bears little 
resemblance to the rational-critical debate idealized by Habermas. Events are 
manipulated to provide the maximum televisual impact, and debates and talk shows are 
structured so that extreme points of view can clash to maximum effect, increasing ratings 
but doing little  to contribute to the formation of discursive public opinion. Moreover, 
topic selection reflects the pressures of commercial, political, and proprietal interests, and 
programs can be viewed as providing an illusion of participation, which encourages 
citizens to feel as though their democratic rights are being exercised. This does not mean 
that mass media is not seen by some as a gateway to democratic participation. Curran 
(1991) argues how traditional media could play a democratic role in society by acting as 
an agency o f representation. He suggests that media should be structured to allow diverse 
social groups to express their views. However, analyzing the democratic effect o f these 
media cannot be carried out only through studying ratings and market shares, but also 
through studying the process in which programs are structured and put on the air, and 
what forces are responsible for controlling them.
Studying the Impact of Television
The process w ith which to study the impact of mass media in general, and 
television in particular, on the building o f a healthy democratic public sphere is not 
limited only to an in-depth study o f each of the phases of television production, it also 
must take into account the evolution o f external influence and the general context. These 
are factors such as the political situation, cultural situation, communications media, and 
the dynamics o f the audio-visual market. (Sala 2001) Such a study must also take into 
account the background o f each media, the laws that regulate it, and ownership status. As
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a matter o f fact, “each society has to reinvent broadcasting in its own image as a means of 
containing and suppressing the geographical, political, spiritual, and social dilemmas 
which broadcasting entails.” 2
Quite a few studies have been dedicated to comparative studies o f communication 
systems and media in different countries and formats, and, in all these studies, members 
o f the public sphere must, especially those in the media, adhere to certain rules fo r an 
'ideal speech situation' to occur. They are as follows: Every subject with the competence 
to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse; Everyone is allowed to question 
any assertion whatever; Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the 
discourse; Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs; No speaker 
may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as laid 
down before. (Villa, 1992) I f  all these rules are set in place, then television is really a 
democratic medium that provides equal access to all and helps everyone in attaining their 
goals, no matter what they are. However, we still have along way to go to achieve a real 
freedom of access and speech in television as a whole, especially in developing countries 
where the government has a strong control over media.
Does Television Entail Democracy?
There are among scholars and media observers those who regard television as a 
genuinely democratic medium w ith  the capacity to bring politics into the houses of 
voters, thus enabling them to be critica l. But on the other hand there are those who 
consider that television commodifies politics into short 'image bites', and that television 
campaigns tend to bypass journalists through the use o f 'managed' political events.
2. Quote form Anthony Smith, President o f the Magdalen College at Oxford, and once a program editor for the BBC
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Television is also seen as a medium that promotes a certain trend’s point of view, while 
suppressing the other, because of the financial or po litica l lim itations imposed on the 
medium. However, Habermas is not as worried about analyzing questions of ownership 
and control. He introduced the idea of the public sphere, describing it as a forum for 
public opinion, and as a mediator between the private and state spheres. Through the 
public sphere, individuals can exercise political contro l and create discourse. Habermas 
maintains that access should be guaranteed fo r all citizens. However, he also maintains 
that “ rational citizens”  are a prerequisite fo r such a forum to succeed, making public 
access more restricted than what he in itia lly  argues for. He does not take into 
consideration the financial reality of starting a medium that is tru ly expensive, nor does 
he seem to take the masses into account. Newspapers, magazines, radio, and television 
act as the media for a “ rationally-restricted”  public sphere only.
Nonetheless, in its European origins, the free press was inspired by ideas of 
natural rights and citizenship in respect o f monarchy and rulers fo llow ing Locke’s theory, 
a legal tradition which sought to lim it state power, secular views based on rationalism 
and free thought rather than religious doctrine, and a be lie f in a pluralist 'marketplace of 
ideas' and diversity o f information based on economic laissez-faire principles. Moreover, 
M ilton  was perhaps the most celebrated o f those preceding writers who triumphantly 
argued the case fo r press freedom, giving a number o f reasons to why licensing and 
censorship was counter-productive: It was not in the tradition o f free speech; people 
should be considered mature enough to discern good from  evil; even the Bible would 
have to be censored because that book contained tales o f both good and evil; objective 
truth is that which is tested by contrary points o f view; the government is assuming
18
in fa llib ility  when deciding whether a medium is “ good”  or not; and, fina lly , the people 
might not be as enthusiastic to defend their government in times o f foreign attack. 
(Alleyne, 1994) Furthermore, M ill reaffirmed that “ there is a lim it to the legitimate 
interference of collective opinion with individual independence: and to find  that lim it, 
and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition o f human 
affairs, as protection against political despotism.”  (M ill, 1859, in Acton 1972: 73)
Interactive Media: Beyond Traditional Boundaries
Earlier in the century, John Dewey envisaged developing a newspaper that would 
convey "thought news," bringing all the latest ideas in science, technology, and the 
intellectual world to a general public, which would also promote democracy. (Czitrom, 
1982) In addition, Berto lt Brecht and Walter Benjamin (Benjamin, 1969) perceived the 
radical potential o f innovative technologies similar to film  and radio and advocated the 
seizure of these new forces o f production, in order to "re-function" them, and to turn them 
into instruments to democratize and revolutionize society. Sartre too worked on radio and 
television series and insisted that "committed writers must get into these relay station arts 
of the movies and radio." (Sartre, 1974: 177)
In fact, effective use o f technology is essential in contemporary politics and that 
those who wish to intervene in the new public spheres need to deploy new 
communications media to participate in democratic debate and to shape the future o f 
contemporary societies and culture. As a matter o f fact, new communication 
technologies, especially satellite TV , now seem to serve the purpose o f revolutionizing 
societies. Tyrannical behavior can supposedly be exposed, dissident opinions can be 
aired, and public opinion can be relayed back to governments. Nonetheless, I  argue that
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broadcast media like radio and television, and now computers, have produced new public 
spheres and spaces for information, debate, and participation that contain the potential to 
invigorate democracy and to increase the dissemination o f critical and new ideas. In 
addition to this great potential is the risk o f finding new possibilities for manipulation, 
social control, and the promotion o f pro-government and stagnant positions.
Participation in these new public spheres all requires critical persons to gain new 
technical skills and to master new technologies. It also requires enabling access to those 
who do not have the means to promote their views in the traditional means of 
communication. However, the mere existence of this new public sphere does not 
consequently imply more freedom and more access by everyone. In effect, the "New 
Media" as we know it are no longer "Mass Media". Mass media, in the traditional sense 
o f sending a limited number o f messages to a homogenous mass audience, was replaced 
by the new media in which the m u ltip lic ity  o f messages and sources can be sent and the 
audience itself becomes more selective. Therefore, there is evolution from a "mass 
society" to a "segmented society," and the Lebanese experience with Satellite televisions 
is one example of this “ segregation.”
The New Public Sphere in Lebanon
As we w ill see in the fo llow ing  chapter, the Lebanese media experience is a 
complex matter which projects a multi-layered reality o f the traditional Public Sphere 
Habermas and others refer to. In Habermas’ view, it  is spaces sim ilar to satellite 
televisions that enabled critical th inking and paved the way towards more freedom of 
expression and interactive debate. However, the Lebanese structure and experience 
cannot be only seen as a promoter o f the freedom o f speech and a “ bearer o f opinion.”  In
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fact, many other elements come into play in the Lebanese case, one of them being the 
sectarian structure of media, its elitist ownership control, and the regional players that 
influence its broadcast. Actually, the Lebanese experience goes beyond the criticisms of 
Adorno and Brecht and the need for an interactive media, because the former offers 
interactivity, but is nonetheless still tied down to its regional and local realities. Dajani 
offers an extensive study of the Lebanese case in his book Disoriented Media in a 
Fragmented Society: the Lebanese Experience (Dajani, 1992), where he observes and 
analyses the sectarian and elitist structure o f the Lebanese society. However, his book 
was published prior to the audiovisual laws o f 1994 and 1996, and before the airing of the 
first satellite broadcasts in 1996. Moreover, ownership is rarely discussed in similar later 
studies, although it explains a big part of the media reality in Lebanon. Furthermore, the 
recent developments play a an even more important part in studying and understanding 
where the supposed Lebanese Public Sphere is heading towards, because of new 
ownership, mergers, and governmental interferences that I w ill analyze later in this study.
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Chapter 2: Lebanese and Arab Media and
Satellite History
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O f the 22 countries that constitute the Arab world, Lebanon is by far one o f the 
most liberal countries, whether it is through its liberal market or its society. The 
Lebanese media has furthermore been a pioneer in distributing information freely, despite 
the various limitations put in place by the Ottoman, French, and current Lebanese 
administration. Lebanese journalists have been known to write their opinion regardless 
o f pressures from governments, and have also been known to exile themselves fo r the 
purpose o f keeping their “ pens”  free. Numerous have fled to Egypt and the United States 
under the Ottoman and French rule, and the many that stayed have always defied 
oppression and been punished fo r it. Nevertheless, Lebanon remains a country where 
freedoms are limited and undermined despite all the efforts made to overcome this 
situation. This is why it  offers a great example for this study: Lebanon has acquired 
means o f communication that are not government-controlled by definition, which would 
f it  them into the liberal trade theory o f commercial means of communication controlled 
by independent capital and advertising revenues, and therefore free. However, the 
complex structure of these “ independent”  means of communication makes them 
vulnerable to the traditional means o f control, mainly by the government. And this is 
furthermore exacerbated w ith the emergence o f the new means of communication that 
constitute a greater responsibility to the traditional power structure.
Lebanon’s “ Special Freedoms”
Although part of the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon was given a special “ protocol”  in 
1861 that assured the preservation o f freedom in its territories. This protocol was signed 
by England, Russia, France, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire, and only included the area 
o f Mount Lebanon. However, the early print media misused these rights to promote a
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certain ethnic and religious message and spoke fo r one group to the detriment of the 
others and thus could not be defined as either objective or journalistic in the professional 
sense o f the word. Ironically, this is how mass media in Lebanon is viewed and operates 
until this day, despite its ancient myth that the media promote freedom of speech. As a 
matter o f fact, Dajani and other scholars refer to the year 1916 as the turning point when 
media censorship made it clear that it reached its peak: the year when 16 journalists were 
hanged in Damascus for influencing public opinion. (Dajani 1992) The hanging came 
under the last vestiges of the Ottoman rule, which was known to be oppressive and brutal, 
before the end o f World War I and the beginning o f a hopeful new era. Many journalists 
that had fled to Egypt thought the French mandate w ill improve this situation, and had 
high hopes fo r returning to their home country.
However, by 1920, the French mandate was taking a more tangible and colonialist 
form  and did not change the situation but further restricted freedom of the press: 250 
publications were discontinued by the end o f the French mandate that lasted from 1920 
up until 1946. (Kamalipour and Mowlana, 1994) Also, gaining independence from the 
French did not generate freedom of speech nor did it improve the conditions of the 
Lebanese media as was thought early on. Actua lly, the established French laws remained 
in practice until 1953; 7 years after the last French soldier withdrew from the Lebanese 
territory. Moreover, the decree put into w riting  that year further banned the issuance of 
new licenses for publications as long as a certain number o f dailies and weeklies were 
maintained, and it was not until 1962 that an o ffic ia l Lebanese press law was established, 
and it only covered print media. This law prohibited the publication of news that 
endangers the national security or unity or frontiers o f the state or that degrade a foreign
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head of state. (Kamalipour and Mowlana, 1994) This vague law is s till in use today and 
decides what can be aired or published, and is the basis o f self-censorship o f all 
journalists in all media fields. Moreover, the chaotic events that Lebanon went through 
and is still going through made national security the perfect excuse fo r the Lebanese 
government to interfere and exercise its controlling power on mass media, despite the 
continuous efforts o f the latter to rise above censorship, and despite the commercial 
nature of television. Furthermore, though Lebanese television started as a private 
commercial venture, it  developed into a replica of Lebanese society that could never 
overcome its limitations.
Television as a Private Enterprise
The French government in Lebanon was the first entity that established the 
country’s radio broadcast service in 1937, and it was then transferred directly to the 
Lebanese government in 1946. The story of Lebanese television is quite different. 
Contrary to the development o f other Arab countries, the firs t television company that 
was founded on Lebanese soil was a private enterprise run by two Lebanese businessmen 
in agreement w ith the Lebanese government. This, Dajani insists, is the “ Lebanese 
television's main weakness, fo r the logic of a commercial enterprise in the developing 
countries often runs counter to that o f public service and societal w ell being.”  (Dajani 
1992:91)
Other schools o f thought runs counter to this argument, stating that freedom of 
the media worldwide go hand in hand with free-market capitalism. In effect, it was a 
combination between private enterprise and government that led to the inauguration of 
the first television. The endeavor to set up television broadcasting in Lebanon started
25
October 1954 when two Lebanese businessmen, Wissam Izzedine and Alec Arida, put 
forward a request to form a television broadcasting company with the financial help of 
the French government. An agreement was signed on August 1956 after two years of 
negotiations, and consequently La Compagnie Libanaise de Television (CLT) was bom. 
However, the license was not a monopoly as the applicants had requested, but it 
authorized them to broadcast television signals on two VHF channels, one in Arabic and 
the other in French. The first commercial television station in the Arab world station 
inaugurated its service on May 28, 1959.
However, the agreement signed with the government predetermined that the 
television would remain under official government inspection, and would not be 
permitted to broadcast programs that would threaten “ public security, morals, religious 
groups, or enhance the image of any political personality or party.” (Dajani, 2001) This 
broad form of restriction is what mainly characterizes the relationship between the 
government and television stations today, whether it comes through voluntary or forced 
censorship. Under the conditions of CLT’s contract, television programs were restricted 
to education and entertainment only. It allowed the company a certain appearance of 
political expression, as superficial as it can be, but was quite generous in giving it all the 
time it needed for advertising: advertising messages could cover up to 25 per cent o f the 
total broadcast time. (Dajani, 1992) Finally, the agreement also required that the 
company should broadcast, free o f charge, news programs and official bulletins 
submitted by the Ministry of Information. Additionally, television was to be subject to 
all laws and regulations relevant to the rights of the press and of authors, as well as all 
national and international laws and regulations dealing with wireless communication and
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broadcasting. The contract was signed for 15 years at the end of which the government 
had the right to buy the television’s installations.
Another group of Lebanese businessmen, backed by the American network ABC, 
approached the government with a request to set up a second television station, 
Compagnie de Television du Liban et du Proche-Orient — Tele Orient. In the case of 
Tele Orient, transmission began on May 6, 1962, under an agreement similar to the one 
granted to CLT, and with programming similar to CLT in Arabic, English, and French. 
However, a tough competition and a lack of adequate organization, especially in selling 
advertising time, plagued the two television companies the first decade of their existence. 
This drove both companies to join forces and develop similar advertising sales techniques, 
and to coordinate the programming and marketing of their programs. Until the beginning 
of the c iv il war in 1975, the two companies succeeded in making large amounts of profit 
and revenue from television advertising, and total television income from advertising 
showed a 19.5 per cent increase over 1973 and constituted 35.3 per cent of total 1974 
advertising expenditure in Lebanon. (Dajani, 2001) Additionally, both companies sold 
locally produced programs to television institutions in the Arab countries.
In December 1974 the Lebanese Council o f Ministers renewed the license of CLT 
for a period of nine years only, and the new agreement sought to institutionalize and 
formalize the political control of broadcasting by the government. Under the terms of the 
new agreement, the Lebanese government had the authority to buy the transmission 
installations and lease them to CLT, and two government censors were to be permanently 
present at the station. The agreement also stipulated CLT would broadcast a daily one-
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hour early evening program prepared by the government. It further required that CLT 
pay 6.5% o f its net advertising revenue to the government and authorized a maximum of 
nine minutes of advertising per hour, with a maximum of three minutes during news 
programs. The 1974 agreement also made general requests that TV  programs should be 
"of the highest possible standards" and that CLT should "train its staff in the artistic and 
technical fields." (Dajani, 1992: 96)
However, not only were the clauses in the agreement too vague to be applied 
fully, but also the outbreak of the civil war a year later paralyzed the government’s 
institutions and made it even harder to follow the contract’ s rules and regulations. 
Nonetheless, this did not prevent the government from initiating a similar agreement in 
December 1977 that tied Tele Orient to similar obligations, although failing to implement 
them in their entirety as well.
Damages of the C ivil War
The first two years o f the civil war were seriously damaging and challenging for 
the two television companies: The war reduced advertising drastically, and both 
companies incurred heavy losses. The two television stations were able to keep their 
transmissions going and to prevent their equipment from being damaged, but producing 
programs was a hard thing to do under these circumstances. On March 11, 1976, an 
unsuccessful coup d'etat led by Brigadier General Abdel Aziz al-Ahdab led militias from 
both sides to occupy both stations, which made production totally impossible and 
consequently divided the news rhetoric on both sides to suit the factions’ affiliations. 
Consequently, the news program in the west Beirut station in Tallet al-Khayyat showed
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great support for the Muslim "nationalist forces" while that in the east Beirut station 
supported the President Suleiman Franjieh's Christian supporters. (Dajani, 2002, Dajani, 
1992, Rugh, 1987) General Ahdab also took over the medium wave and FM radio 
transmitters, and both the radio and television in West Beirut broadcast pro-Ahdab 
newscasts each night. Meanwhile, Franjieh's supporters refused to let him resign and 
continued to control short-wave radio transmitters and Hazmieh's Tele Liban branch. 
(Rugh, 1987)
The split of the broadcast media also generated escalation in the war because 
each faction targeted the transmission and equipment of the opponent’s television. 
Moreover, transmission was also badly affected by chronic power failures, which, 
combined with all other factors, incurred heavy losses on both companies and pushed 
them on the verge of bankruptcy. This escalation in events necessitated seeking secure 
financial assistance from the government, which the companies did when they requested 
the interference of the government at the end of 1976. At that point a new president, 
Elias Sarkis, was elected and the pace of hostilities apparently diminished. Elope was 
growing among people that this new government could bring the end of the c iv il war.
Following the televisions’ request, any decision taken by the new government 
could either destroy television in Lebanon or strengthen it and use it to promote the 
institutions of the government and national dialogue. At this point in time, the 
government viewed television as another tool for nation-building, at a time when war was 
destroying national unity. However, i f  it agreed to extend aid, the new regime would also 
have to aid other institutions affected by the war, and it did not have the means and
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resources to do so. To answer these urgent questions a special committee was formed 
under the auspices of the Council of Ministers to study the conditions of television in 
Lebanon. The committee was charged with the task of making recommendations to 
maintain the operation of this medium and preserve it, thus promoting national dialogue. 
(Dajani, 1992) At the end, the committee's report urged the Lebanese government to take 
a more active role in the development of television and recommended merging CLT and 
Tele Orient into a new company controlled mostly by the government, while the private 
sector would control the remaining portion; it further recommended that the two existing 
companies be given the option to purchase the shares of the public sector. The Council 
o f Ministers approved the report and a legislative decree was issued on December 30, 
1977, legalizing the birth of a new television company, the Lebanese Television 
Company — Tele Liban. The company was formed "to manage, organize and utilize the 
various television transmitting installations, and to undertake all commercial and 
television production tasks." (Dajani, 1992: 199) Tele Liban was to be managed by a 
board of directors of twelve members: six representing the Lebanese government and the 
remaining six representing the two companies, while the chairman of the board was to be 
appointed by the Lebanese Council of Ministers.
Accordingly, the financial assistance given by the government not only made it 
possible to rebuild and improve the existing transmitters in order to cover all the 
Lebanese territory, but it also increased the hours o f transmission. However, this change 
further strengthened the official Lebanese policy, which consisted mainly of seeking to 
legalize censorship of television programs in order to keep this medium under control by 
lim iting its political influence.”  The function o f Tele Liban, according to an official at the
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Ministry o f Information, was "to bring together the best of what the public sector had to 
offer -in  terms o f its primary concern for the needs of the country- and the strength of the 
private sector in dynamic management and profit making." (Dajani, 2001) However, 
both government and the private sector, which jointly managed television under the Tele 
Liban plan, continued to provide programs that were determined by their private political 
or economic interests more than by the public interest. Not a single local television 
program addressed the serious sectarian problem that plagued the Lebanese society and 
was one of the main causes of the civil war. And while television, and the print media in 
general, apparently gave their audiences an "over-dose" o f political discussions, there 
always has been an almost total absence of public affairs programming and lack of 
investigative reporting about issues that affect the livelihood o f the average Lebanese — 
such as the shortage of water and electricity supplies. (Dajani, 2001) Habermas’ idea of 
the creation of a Public Sphere that would promote national dialogue was rendered in the 
Lebanese case into a commercial venture that is oblivious o f the realities of civil war and 
the fragmentation o f c iv il society, and no government action would be able to stop the 
drastic changes that were to come.
The Mushrooming of Illegal Media Stations
Furthermore, what escalated to become a 15 years o f c iv il war in Lebanon 
destabilized the whole system and shook the existing structures o f mass media as 
established earlier in the century. The war decentralized all the major institutions, 
including mass media, even with the creation of an offic ia l governmental television 
station. The events that occurred during the war weakened the operation of public media
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institutions, both radio and television, and strengthened private ventures instead. Thus, 
following the divisions that occurred on the state level, private militias, political parties, 
and others showed interest in sponsoring several television and radio station, as well as 
newspapers and magazines. As Hammoud and A fifi say, “ the opportunity to distribute -  
often biased -  information illegally through mass media channels without penalty was too 
attractive for most political parties to ignore.”  (Kamalipour and Mowlana, 1994: 161) 
Moreover, the divisions that occurred on the geographical level also instigated the need 
for television and radio that go beyond the traditional boundaries, and controlling those 
means permitted different political parties to send their message to others. These 
televisions and radio stations worked as satellite television do today, sending messages 
across boundaries to reach people from other “ countries”  and “ societies.”  As a result, the 
worsening of the state of affairs in Lebanon and the further deterioration o f the central 
government during the Amin Jemayel presidency in the mid 1980s encouraged some of 
the warring factions to establish their own pirate television stations, which resulted in a 
mushrooming of televisions overnight, with one main objective: spreading each faction’s 
ideology while undermining the others’ .
Most important among these new televisions was the Lebanese Broadcasting 
Company (LBC), which was the official organ of the Christian m ilitia the “ Lebanese 
Forces,”  and Al-Mashrek Television, established by politicians opposed to the regulars of 
LBC, mainly the Syrian Nationalist Party. Also among the important pirate stations at 
the time was the New Television (NTV) established by the Lebanese communist party 
and later bought by independent businessman Tahseen Khayyat and other independents. 
LBC went on the air in August 1985 and quickly captured the interest of a wide array o f
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viewers in terms of entertainment and variety. Al-Mashrek (The Orient) Television began 
its experimental broadcasting in 1989 and started airing regular programs in April 1990. 
By the beginning of 1991 it became a serious competitor for both LBC and Tele Liban 
and its heavy use of Arabic programs and films attracted large audiences. New 
Television began its transmission in April 1991 and aired programs that had no 
relationship to the ideology of the communist party but were mainly commercial. Other 
television stations with more limited coverage included Sigma TV and K ilik ia Television, 
both based in West Beirut, the Muslim district, and both were only interested in 
transmitting music videos and important entertainment programs. (Dajani, 1992) 
Moreover, the mushrooming of TV stations in Lebanon did not end here: in the early 
1990’s, C33, Al-Salam TV, TV One, Cable Video Network, and ICN were among a few 
other televisions with less impact on the Lebanese audience, while Murr TV and Future 
television were the latest additions to the group, with a substantive bigger effect on 
Lebanese politics and people.
The creation of de facto television stations faced both the Lebanese government 
and the private sector involved with Tele Liban with a new challenge; the deterioration of 
the quality of the human element and technical skills at Tele Liban allowed the de facto 
stations to easily attract Lebanese viewers to their programs and consequently draw 
advertisers to them. Consequently, Tele Liban officials filed a lawsuit requesting large 
financial compensation from the three leading de facto stations at the time: LBC, al- 
Machrek, and NTV. However, all television stations, including Tele Liban, were 
generally indifferent to the public needs for the coverage of subjects that relate to their 
livelihood, such as the problems of the shortage of electricity and water, pollution, and
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the high cost o f living. Instead, these stations focused on engaging in an ideological war 
between the various factions, and limited itself to representing and attacking political 
officials, political parties, and players in the political realm in general. Televisions were 
also highly biased in covering news of the raging war that was going on.
During the famous 1989 Taif agreement, Lebanese members o f the parliament 
were able to arrive at a regionally and internationally supported accord that marked the 
end of the Lebanese c iv il war. The Taif Agreement, which was later incorporated in the 
Lebanese constitution, called for the reorganization of the media in Lebanon, among 
other more important “ co-existence” clauses. The deliberations of members of the 
parliament called for legalizing the existing de facto radio and television stations and 
upon the signing of this agreement many politicians and businessmen hurried to set up 
television stations so as to establish their "right" for a television license. By the end of 
1991, 46 television stations were set up in a matter of few months and some ten of the 
new stations were on the air, transmitting on UHF channels as all the VHF channels were 
already in use. (Dajani, 1992) This state of affairs was the natural extension to what civil 
society was going through during the difficult warring years. As a matter of fact, it was 
the most natural expansion of the Public Sphere(s) that mushroomed during the war, and 
came as a result o f already-present societal segmentation.
The Sectarian Structure of the Media
Like any set o f institutions rooted in a political system, the broadcast media of a 
country or region reflect the existing distribution of power, and the Taif agreement 
consecrated this power balance, whether in its parliamentary seats’ distribution, or the
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endless effort to balance between the powers of the Maronite President, the Sunni Prime 
Minister, and the Shiite Chief o f Parliament. To see how this structural relationship can 
result in censorship in the media realm, it  is instructive to start by looking at broadcasting 
arrangements in Lebanon, since these are potentially the most liberal in the Arab world 
and the most divisive on the societal level. In the Lebanese confessional system, political 
positions are assigned on the basis of sectarian affiliation, while unified state institutions 
take a back seat. Parliamentary seats are divided according to a “ representative”  model, 
whereby each sect is represented according to a percentage it supposedly holds within the 
overall population. Moreover, directors, c iv il servants, diplomats, and even teachers in 
public service are chosen according to their faith and political affiliation. The Lebanese 
typical college and high school graduates find themselves having to go back to their 
religious leaders or political figures that are affiliated with their sect in order to find a job. 
In other words, there is no space for qualifications in this state of affairs. In the case of 
media in Lebanon today, each private station is linked to a prominent politician or 
religious group, and the majority of these stations’ employees reflect the sectarian nature 
of each station. Furthermore, as we w ill see at a later stage in this study, ownership 
reflects not only sectarian but also political and familial affiliations based on sectarian 
backgrounds. This element o f the study is the most important in later discussion of media 
status and satellite status in Lebanon, because it is one of the most decisive elements in 
how each station makes internal decisions, and how the government interacts with each 
station.
The Lebanese media situation is an example of the contradictory state of 
transformation and persistence that Lebanon is going through. The existing media laws
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specify that television institutions be not directly managed or run by the government or 
private individuals or politicians. The practice, however, is different but is congruent with 
the special socio-political structure of the Lebanese society. In a country divided 
intrinsically along sectarian preference, governmental actions of censorship and 
oppression reflect a power balance that is increasingly unequal. Moreover, dividing these 
stations along opposition and pro-government lines also show the degree to which the 
government allows freedom of speech that is different from its own, and to what degree 
the government allows opposition to state its views about the government and its allies. 
In addition, internal rifts within the government also play an important role in looking at 
these means of communication and their effect on government and the public, as we w ill 
later see. Last but not least, ownership and economic issues also play an important role in 
the Lebanese media case because they further reflect the sectarian and political backdrop 
and strengthen their stronghold through economic means. Furthermore, the fact that these 
politicians seek support from powerful regional players increases the complexity that 
they have with the media, creating layers o f censorship that go beyond the local arena. 
A ll these issues play a role in the Lebanese media structure, and affect the impact of the 
New Media in particular on democracy and freedom of speech.
Satellite Technology in the Arab W orld
Despite the fact that Lebanon was developed in the media arena, the country’s 
c iv il war prevented the technological development brought by satellite and encouraged 
by Arab countries since the late 1960s and up until the eighties. In fact, Lebanon was a 
latecomer in this area, although it later became a powerful player in the area of
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entertainment. In fact, it was the Gulf that first introduced the medium to countless of
Arabs, a fact that goes counter the theory that says that information technology w ill 
revolutionize societies in drastic ways. Moreover, this New Public Sphere that was 
created was first provided for pure entertainment purposes, and in its first stages was only 
interactive for entertainment purposes also, which limited the area for analytical and 
constructive political and social discussions.
Still, the introduction of Satellite broadcasting and the Internet challenged 
information control by Arab states in a way that was not possible before. And this 
started not only in the 1990s with the advent of satellite television proliferation, but even 
before that with the introduction of satellite sending of printed information to publish 
newspapers around the world. With this new technology, government and businessman 
strived to control Arab audiences in new ways, which created a competitive state of 
affairs never before seen in the Arab world. Satellite access was and still is limited to 
government bodies and wealthy businessmen, however, which made this information 
revolution less powerful than it should have been.
The first major impact o f new satellite technologies on Arab media happened in 
the eighties and not in the nineties as is commonly known: It was the satellite-using daily 
newspapers, not television, which introduced the idea of sharing information across 
traditional boundaries. First al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper, and later al-Hayat newspaper, 
began satellite transmission from London to major population centers throughout the 
Arab world. Although owned by private Saudi interests, these papers address themselves 
to a pan-Arab audience, and their reporters, editors and columnists reflect that sense of 
different Arabic backgrounds. The irony was that in the end it was wealth, generated in a
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conservative Arab country, and not radical Arab ideology such as the Baath party or the 
Nasserist that had brought about a pan-Arab press. (Schleifer, 1998) This trend still holds 
truth until today, with satellite televisions owned by Saudi individuals and powerful 
political and financial elites all over the Arab World.
By the mid-eighties an Arab-states satellite system, called Arabsat, was equipped 
and ready to be used, but despite the original provision of transponders potent enough to 
send out signals that could be picked up by small dishes, there was no attempt to use the 
Arabsat satellites as direct broadcast satellites providing direct broadcast service (DBS) 
either to cable, MMDS and encrypted terrestrial companies retransmitting the 
programming or direct-to-home (DTH) services to the rare but slowly growing number of 
homes equipped with dishes. (Schleifer, 1998) Instead, Arabsat satellites were used in 
this initial phase for news and public affairs exchanges between existing Arab state- 
owned national television stations. This meant that the type of news that people received 
around the Arab world was mainly news of official visits of kings and presidents, without 
any use of real journalistic skills such as political analysis and investigation. Television 
stations were owned by governments, unlike other media that had a slightly wider margin 
of freedom. Moreover, the national television channels were extensions of the ministries 
of information, with the exception of television in Lebanon. As a matter o f fact, it is no 
accident that in a number o f Arab countries the minister of information operated the 
major offices of his ministry from the national television station building. (Schleifer, 
1998)
While recent events have put Arab media at the center of world politics, the 
history of the development o f television satellite broadcasting in the Arab world started in
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the early nineties with the second Gulf War, (Amin, 2000; Amin & Boyd, 1994; Barkey, 
1996; Kraidy, 1998; Millichip, 1996; Sakr, 1999; Schleifer, 1998) and its rapid growth 
was made possible by political and technical developments put in place since the late 
1960s. During the second Gulf War, the Arab world experienced what has been defined 
by experts as the CNN effect, whereby governments and people in the Arab world 
realized the importance of satellite technologies in getting information as well as 
controlling it. As a matter of fact, as early as 1967, Arab information ministers expressed 
the importance of a satellite network whose objective would be the integration of the 
social and cultural activities of the Arab League, a regional organization formed after 
W orld War II. Furthermore, the Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU) was created in 
1969 to oversee the establishing of such an organization. Saudi Arabia did not join the 
Egypt-led and Cairo-based ASBU until 1974, probably because of the tense relationship 
between Saudi Arabia and Egypt at the time. On April 14, 1976, the Arab Satellite 
Communications Organization (ARABSAT) was established under Arab League 
jurisdiction, and was entrusted with serving the information, cultural and educational 
needs of its members. Saudi Arabia was the main financier of the new organization, 
because of its considerable financial resources expanded by the oil price boom of 1973, 
and Riyadh, the Saudi capital, housed its headquarters. (Boyd, 1999) Today, Saudi 
Arabia takes the lead in satellite communication systems in the Arab world.
After an unsuccessful launching endeavor by a French Ariane rocket led to the 
loss of the first satellite 1-A, the U.S. space shuttle Discovery successfully launched a 
second ARABSAT satellite, 1-B in 1985. (Amin &  Boyd, 1994) ARABSAT then 
launched its second generation satellites 2-A  and 2-B in July and November, 1996
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respectively, and the expanded technical capacities o f ARABSAT 2 were said to give 
ARABSAT a competitive edge in the region. (Kazan, 1996) The third generation of 
ARABSAT 3-A satellite was launched in February 1999 and is currently co-located with 
2-A. This last satellite is a powerful transmitter with one single transponder covering all 
Arab countries, most o f Europe and a good part of Africa. In 1997, Egypt launched its 
first Satellite NILESAT 101 and by 1999 there were 68 channels, Arab and foreign, using 
it because of its coverage in the region. Other satellites that serve the region include 
EutelSat w2 and Hotbird 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. (Darouny, 2000)
During the course of all this technological advancement, Arab governments 
competed with private companies for a share in the distribution and content of 
information and entertainment directed towards more than 300 m illion Arabic speakers 
across the Arab Middle East and other regions of the world. A  race to occupy the living 
rooms of Arabs around the world began. Initial satellite broadcasts by the Middle East 
Broadcasting Center (MBC) and the Egyptian government satellite channel (ESC) in 
1991 were followed by a variety of contenders: In 1993, Arab Radio and Television 
(ART) began broadcasting in Arabic and English. It was soon followed by Orbit Satellite 
Television and Radio Network, which in 1994 transmitted on 19 television channels. 
(Russell, 1994) Both these stations aired from Italy, while MBC aired from London. By 
1996, Arab skies were raided by a surplus of satellite televisions. Several government- 
sponsored services emerged, such as Libya TV, Yemen TV, Jordan TV, Oman TV and 
the Syrian Satellite Channel, and they competed against private corporations such as 
MBC, ART, Orbit, and also Lebanon’s Future Television and the Lebanese Broadcasting
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Corporation International, both o f whom were relatively late comers when they went on 
the air respectively in 1994 and 1996. (Kraidy, 1998)
Lebanon’s position in the Arab World
Historically, Lebanon has always been an essential component of pan-Arab and 
transnational media. Baha Abu Laban reported that in the 1960s, President Nasser of 
Egypt read the Lebanese press first thing in the morning to get a sense of current affairs 
in the Arab world. (Kraidy, 2000) This is due to the fact that the Lebanese press has 
traditionally reflected the political currents and power struggles occurring in the region as 
well as on the local level. In reality, Lebanon’s unique political and social history has 
given this small country leverage and influence in the rest of the Arab world, particularly 
in mass media. Lebanese journalists have always been pioneers in the field o f media and, 
despite various repressions, have been able to maintain their status as political and social 
analysts even i f  they had to immigrate to do so. Also, with all the technologies at hand 
today, scholars view the digital age o f satellite broadcasting and the Internet as a way to 
increase Lebanon's media's influence in the Arab world furthermore. (Kraidy, 2000)
The pan-Arab influence of Lebanese television can also be explained by other 
factors. Even though LBC, and since 1994 LBCI, was first created as a mouthpiece for 
the Christian right-wing m ilitia  group the “ Lebanese Forces,”  the station remained 
focused on its main goal, which was commercial initially. As a matter o f fact, throughout 
the civil war, LBCI attracted a large section of the Muslim audience by broadcasting 
Fawazeer Ramadan, an entertainment program produced only during the holy month of 
Ramadan, in addition to other special programming. This is seen as a grand gesture in a 
community divided along sectarian lines with each sect having its own television and
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radio station. This commercial logic, imitated later on by other stations such as Future 
television, has made these companies competitive, aiming for international production 
standards despite limited specificities. Moreover, unlike other Arab broadcasters, these 
companies did not have to please a certain ruling class to acquire a budget for their 
productions, but had to attract and keep an audience in order to maintain a stable flow of 
advertising dollars. In other words, the relationship between the media and the 
government was not as obvious as was the case with other Arabic channels.
In the 1990s, Lebanese television stations, and most prominently LBCI, produced 
a variety o f socio-political talk shows which became w ild ly popular with Lebanese 
audiences. These shows tackled many issues usually considered taboo in the Arab world, 
many of which were social issues such as premarital sex, incest, and homosexuality. 
Other episodes had distinctly political themes, such as representative democracy, civil 
rights, gender equality, religion and atheism, freedom of speech and others. (Kraidy, 
2002) Many of these shows were not broadcast via satellite at first, such as Ziad Njeim’s 
“ Istifta”  on Murr TV, and therefore they did not reach a vast pan-Arab audience. 
However, some of them gradually reached the transnational level and reached Arab 
homes over the globe, therefore affecting in one way or the other the usual status quo that 
Arab leaders were used to. This novelty was seen as a first step towards an active role of 
the Lebanese media in Arab countries including Lebanon, especially in the light o f the 
fact that the trend in other Arab satellites’ programming was geared solely towards 
entertainment, with the exception of Al-Jazeera television that was founded later in 1996.
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Transition between War and Satellite
During the period between 1960 and the early 1990s, broadcasting exploded out 
of proportion within the Lebanese borders. The years of c iv il war created a state of chaos 
in the Lebanese skies so, in order to control the rising number o f TV  stations and their 
coverage, the Lebanese parliament passed a set of regulations in 1994 to re-structure 
broadcasting. According to the new law, the only four authorities that could control a 
media source were the Prime Minister and his/her cabinet. In formulating media 
regulations, Arab states are primarily concerned with national security, often very loosely 
defined as any criticism of the current regime. Moreover, laws regulating the media tend 
to be ambiguous and flexible, giving the governments a lot o f power to interpret them 
however they want to. In addition, law enforcement tends to be very selective, meaning 
that i f  a media outlet has close connections to government officials and it breaches a 
regulation, it is protected from being shut down. Besides, there are still many 
overlapping legal jurisdictions. For example, television stations have to abide not only to 
the newly-created audiovisual law, but also to election laws, press laws and media laws.
The attempt to regulate television stations in Lebanon happened during Elias 
Hrawi’s presidency, which had the enormous job of re-establishing government authority 
after the civil war. The first Hrawi government felt the urgency of introducing new 
legislation that puts order into the broadcasting field, and therefore in 1991 the Minister 
of Information recommended the reorganization of television broadcasting in Lebanon. 
The first attempted reorganization granted local licenses only to stations whose total 
assets are Lebanese and whose stations broadcasted exclusively on UHF channels. 
However, in order not to upset the delicate status quo, the M inister recommended that
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Tele Liban be able to lease temporarily some of its channels to other stations in return for 
a fee. By that, the government insured the rights of Tele Liban and provided it with funds 
to improve its facilities and services while at the same time allowing the de facto stations 
to continue their operation, thus appeasing the different warring factions. The 
recommendations of the Minister were referred to a special ministerial committee, and 
the committee's deliberations were the basis of a January 1992 Council o f Ministers 
decision, which stated that "all television institutions which are presently operating de 
facto and in contradiction to the existing laws as well as anybody who wishes to invest in 
television must submit, w ithin a period of one month, an application fo r commercial 
television broadcasting. (Kraidy, 1996) The Council of Ministers also requested the 
ministerial committee to determine the criteria and fees for granting licenses.
However, according to press reports, the ministers’ deliberations also dealt with 
the likelihood of restricting television news to Tele Liban, which created a huge turmoil. 
Press reports suggested that both the President and the Prime Minister called for an end to 
the chaos and to the lack of restraint in the operation of media institutions, and following 
the meeting several members o f the Council of Ministers and numerous politicians issued 
statements criticizing the deliberations. The ambassadors of England, France, the United 
States and the Vatican also made statements supporting freedom of the press as a reaction, 
and a newspaper reported that an ambassador of a prominent country declared that 
suppressing news on television was a demand "forced on the government" from outside, 
but that "freedom in Lebanon is a red line which may not be crossed without negatively 
affecting the country." (Kraidy, 2000)
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A New Audiovisual Law
This resulted in a prompt response from the spokesman of the Prime Minister, 
who denied that any decision was taken to restrict television news to Tele Liban, and the 
ministerial committee quickly addressed itself to the task of drafting proposals for 
legalizing the de facto stations and recommended that, until a new law governing 
broadcasting in Lebanon is issued, the de facto stations be given annual leases, not 
licenses, on the available UHF channels. Two years of indecision and delays passed until 
the Council of Ministers finally approved a draft law regulating the chaotic use of the 
broadcasting channels in Lebanon, and the new law was adopted with minor 
modifications by the Lebanese parliament in November 1994. Under the terms of this law 
Tele Liban was to be fully owned by the government and its exclusive television 
broadcasting right was to be revoked in return for granting it the right to broadcast on all 
the VHF channels and one UHF channel. However, no compensation by the de facto 
stations was granted to Tele Liban.
The new law required that establishing TV stations inside Lebanese territories or 
its national waters be subject to prior licensing (Chapter 2, Article five) . It stipulated 
that the duration of the license be sixteen years, renewable (Chapter 5, Article twenty- 
six)4, and confirmed that licenses be granted by a government decree after consulting the 
new council established by this law: "the National Council of Audio Visual Media.”  This 
council has, according to the audiovisual law, the power to recommend the suspension or 
closure of stations, and is formed of ten members appointed jointly by the government
3 Audiovisual Law of 1994 translated by Marwan Kraidy, 1996
4 Ibid.
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and parliament (Chapter 5, Article seventeen).5 The only other entity that exercised this 
kind of authority was to be the minister of information, fo llow ing a suggestion by the 
cabinet. Moreover, the law classified television stations according to the following: the 
first category being the television stations that transmit visual programs, including news 
and political programs, covering all the Lebanese territory. The second Category contains 
the television stations that transmit visual programs with the exception of news and 
political programs, covering all the Lebanese territory. The third category falls under the 
television stations that transmit coded signals and can only be received by subscribers 
who possess the necessary technical equipment, while the fourth category contains the 
international television stations that transmit via satellite and whose coverage goes 
beyond the Lebanese territory. (Chapter 3, Article ten.)6
Granting broadcasting licenses requires, among other things, obtaining approved 
technical transmission standards; meeting the necessary operational standards in terms of 
its human and physical resources, and presenting evidence of its ability to sustain 
expenses for at least its first year of licensing. The law, furthermore, requires the station 
to broadcast a volume of local production fixed by the "terms o f conditions” of 
broadcasting in Lebanon (Chapter 2, Article seven)7. What's more, the law limits 
granting radio and television licenses to Lebanese citizens or companies, and the number 
of licenses is also limited to one for individual companies or persons, meaning that one 
entity cannot own shares in more than one medium. Most importantly, the audiovisual 
law does not allow for a person or entity to own directly or indirectly more than ten
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
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percent of the total company shares. This includes the husband or wife and all direct 
relatives, all considered one person or entity. (Chapter 4, Article thirteen)
The new audiovisual law was faced with a massive open debate. The weight of 
the very vigorous audio-visual lobby was obvious in the press campaigns and statements 
by politicians warning against "the dangers to freedom in Lebanon." (Kraidy, 2000) 
Clearly, owners of the de facto stations and the political opposition were afraid o f the 
way licenses w ill be granted, and they had reason to worry. In September 1996, the 
government granted licenses only to four television stations other than Tele Liban. 
Ironically, the four television stations belonged to either members o f the government or 
their relatives, maintaining the sensitive religious sectarian balance, a paramount element 
of balance in Lebanese politics.
The stations that received licenses were the Lebanese Broadcasting Company 
International (LBCI), representing the Maronite Christians and whose shareholders 
included prominent members o f the government; Future Television, representing the 
Rafik Hariri's economic vision for Lebanon and owned by the Prime Minister himself; 
Murr Television (MTV), representing the Greek Orthodox Christians and owned by the 
brother of the then Minister o f Interior Michel Murr; and The National Broadcasting 
Network (NBN), representing the Shiite Moslems and owned by the fam ily and 
supporters of the Speaker o f the House of Parliament, Nabih Berry. The governmental 
decision was faced with a very vocal public opposition because it was based on political 
and sectarian than on professional grounds, and the stations that were not licensed refused 
to stop broadcasting, while the government used both threats and promises to implement 
its decision: in some instances it used force to close some stations but in others it allowed
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some to appeal the decision. Only one additional television station, al-Manar, a branch of 
the Islamic Hezbollah Party, which started broadcasting in June 1991 and spoke for the 
resistance against the Israeli occupation o f South Lebanon, received a license in July 
1996. However, a Christian religious station Tele Lumiere continues to broadcast t ill this
8
day without a license but with implicit government backing.
Change came in 1998 when new elections change the government and put Hariri’ s 
opponent Salim El Hoss in the prime ministry. The new government reconsidered the 
applications rejected by the previous regime and consequently granted three more 
licenses. Amusingly, the stations that received the new licenses were ones that opposed 
the former Prime Minister: the New Television (NTV), in June 1999; The Independent 
Communication Channel International (ICN I) and United Television (UTV), both in 
September 1999. Nevertheless, these two channels did not broadcast further than during 
their trial period.
Satellite Television in Lebanon
Following the 1994 audiovisual law, a race to reach the Arab and international 
audience commenced. Satellite reception dishes became among the fastest selling 
commodities in Lebanon by that time, and LBC I started promising to include Canada in 
its coverage plan. December 1998 statistics by Ipsos-Stat, a media research company, 
stated that 58.2% of all Lebanese households had cable subscription to satellite stations 
and Lebanese televisions needed to affirm  its presence with those subscribers as well. In 
fact, the local television stations felt that they are losing a major share of their audiences 
to the cable system and decided to be part o f the new wave.
8 Ibid.
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Lebanese businessmen and television stations saw an excellent profit potential in 
this new development. Two stations ventured into this fie ld even before getting officially 
licensed. These were LBC I and Future Television who established LBCSAT and Future 
International SAT respectively. Both satellite stations were ranked among the leading 
satellite programs in the Arab Gulf countries, an important source of advertising income. 
Founded in February 1993, Future Television started a trial transmission in October 1994; 
the testing period lasted two months on Arabsat 1A and was later launched on Arabsat 
2A. Future International Television has 5-meter and 7-meter dishes installed in its Beirut 
and Sidon sites. An additional 13-meter dish was later installed in the government earth 
station in Jouret el Bailout as a redundant uplink facility. It covers the Middle East, 
North Africa, Southern Europe, North America and Australia.
LBCI plunged into this field in April 1996 when it established LBCSAT, a free 
satellite channel. The channel has been broadcasting 22 hours a day since January 1997. 
Later in 1997 LBC launched three new encrypted channels: LBC Europe, LBC America 
and LBC Australia. Today, LBC Europe is broadcasting 16 hours a day while the two 
other channels broadcast around the clock. A number o f recent audience studies indicate 
that LBCSAT has a leading position alongside Al-Arabiyya in Saudi Arabia and the Arab 
Gulf countries, especially as a negative reaction to Al-Jazeera. LBCI also empowered its 
broadcast by allying itself with Al-Hayat newspaper and thus aiming to become a more 
news-oriented television station alongside its entertainment side.
Faced with the success of both Lebanese satellite stations, the Lebanese 
government decided that the best way to respond was to have its Tele Liban get into 
satellite broadcasting. An official government decision was adopted late in 1999 and
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Tele Liban began its satellite broadcast in the first week of March 2000. The T L  service 
covered the Arab world and part of Europe. However, it merely broadcasted its terrestrial 
programming via satellite, not special programs to satisfy Arab viewers or the Lebanese 
Diaspora, and was later shut down with the collapse of Tele Liban in 2002 because of 
budget deficiencies. A fourth station, al-Manar requested a license for satellite 
transmission and approved the request in April 2000. The satellite service o f al-Manar 
began a four-hour satellite on the eve o f May 24, 2000, the day of the liberation of South 
Lebanon. After the Palestinian "Intifada" broke out, on September 28, 2000, al-Manar 
increased its satellite broadcasting to 18-hours a day. The success of Lebanese satellite 
stations encouraged two other stations to get into this field. M TV began its satellite 
service in November 2000, on the eve of its ninth anniversary, along with New TV.
Satellite broadcasting in Lebanon faced a number of obstacles at the beginning, 
during the regime of President Hrawi and Prime Minister Hariri. The first obstacle was 
to get government clearance to get a satellite connection, and the second and more 
serious one was for the stations to secure the right to broadcast political news. A t the 
beginning, the Hariri government did not permit stations to transmit news on their 
satellite channels. The argument by the government was that Lebanese news programs 
might negatively affect Lebanon's relations with some Arab countries inasmuch as these 
countries may not tolerate the freedom the Lebanese media have. Moreover, it was 
decided that Lebanon’s image is of utmost importance after the end of the c iv il war, in 
order to secure aid and investment from interested and wealthy countries such as the Gulf 
countries. LBCI challenged the ban and continued airing its satellite news program. The 
Hariri government reacted, late in December 1996, by deciding to censor all news as well
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as direct and indirect political programs prepared for satellite broadcasting in general; and 
a special "censorship team" was named including a number of well-respected journalists. 
Again, LBCI challenged the decision and sought a ruling from the state's judiciary 
advisory council. The council supported LBC I and consequently the Lebanese satellite 
channels won another battle for the freedom of information.
Today, only five channels remain in the satellite realm, and these are LBCI, 
Future TV, New TV, NBN, and Al-Manar. The others were either shut down for political 
or financial reasons. Within the Lebanese territory, cable gives access to the four 
channels without the need for subscription, while you pay to get them in the Arab world, 
North America, Europe, and Australia. W hile Al-Manar is mainly political, even in its 
entertainment programming, the other three are more commercially oriented, while not 
receiving a lot of advertising revenues. T ill this day, the race to reach satellite access 
remains political, regardless of the fact that they might not generate profit, and they rarely 
do. Moreover, the news section of these channels remain directly tied to their terrestrial 
counterparts, which makes them oriented more towards local issues and regional issues 
that relate to the local level. This has created problems for these satellite televisions 
because it has made them vulnerable to the government’ s w ill, and more so because they 
project an image of Lebanon that government officials would rather hide. These tensions 
and others created a relationship between the government and satellite televisions that can 
be best portrayed as controlling, as we w ill see in the following chapter.
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Chapter 3: Recent Developments
52
The decade that followed the civil war brought change and hope fo r the Lebanese 
media industry and for the Lebanese people in general. The creation of a law regulating 
the audiovisual realm brought some legality to the chaotic situation that preceded it, and 
many thought that regulating television w ill give more legitimacy to those stations that 
were already present, and a diversity of opinions that would pave the way towards a fu lly  
democratic state. However, the post-war era brought a different reality than what media 
and people were anticipating. A fter the relatively “ free” and unrestricted years o f the 
civil war, where m ultip lic ity o f opinion came as a natural consequence o f the situation, 
the political landscape in Lebanon came to be ruled by one dominant political discourse, 
and Syria became an increasingly major player in Lebanese daily, regional, and 
international affairs, along with other powerful regional players. Moreover, the fu ll­
blown freedom of promoting every station’s own political discourse came to a halt with 
the Lebanese government trying to take control of what was left o f the country, and the 
audiovisual law of 1994 and the more indirect restrictions imposed on mass media 
became recurrent and more frequent as the country rose further away from the chaos of 
civil war. Media was once again seen as a tool for nation-building instead of tool for 
promoting democracy, and was considered a dangerous element i f  it was given full 
freedom of expression.
The Syrian influence was the main factor, and still is, in trying to regulate what 
information survives censorship and what doesn’t, and striving to keep control and 
remain in power was the main drive behind the constant oppression of freedom of speech 
throughout the nineties and until this day. Syria’s interference in daily politics, in 
addition to its m ilitary presence on Lebanese soil, dictated much of how the Lebanese
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government interacted with the Lebanese media. For example, the cabinet of Prime 
Minister Salim Hoss, fearful of partial election coverage by private stations, evoked a 
storm of protest in early 2000 by introducing a bill that forbade all such stations from 
reporting on parliamentary election campaigns, which are often seen as rigged and 
designed especially to favor the traditional government supportive of the Syrian influence. 
This attempt at blanket censorship provided yet another reminder that the scope for 
political commentary by both terrestrial and satellite broadcasters based in Lebanon 
remains subject to local regulation. Thus the survival instinct of the Lebanese regime 
continues to preempt any liberalizing impact o f satellite television especially that these 
fall under its territorial jurisdiction.
Opposition vs. Government
The official ending of Tele-Liban's monopoly under Lebanon's 1994 Audiovisual 
Media Law occurred at a time when the spread of Arab satellite channels was in fu ll 
swing. Indeed, it gave the country's private broadcasters, led by LBCI and Future TV, a 
timely opportunity to enter the satellite race, keeping in mind that its primary purpose 
was to regulate the chaotic explosion of small broadcasting stations that had mushroomed 
during the Lebanese civil war. When, mainly for political rather than technical reasons, 
only six Lebanese television stations were awarded licenses under the law, those deprived 
of access to the airwaves denounced this as an act o f suppression. (Kraidy, 2002) It was 
a not a shock, for example, that Rafik Hariri, Lebanon's prime minister at the time, 
became a beneficiary of the licensing system through his shareholding in Future TV, even 
i f  his name was not originally present among the shareholders. The fact that “ opposition” 
televisions were granted licenses constituted more of a shock to the general population
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than anything else: LBCI, a Maronite and dissenting television, M TV, with Christian 
Orthodox affiliation that is opposed to Christian Orthodox government officials, and 
NTV, owned by Tahseen Khayyat, a businessman strongly opposed to Prime Minister 
Hariri. However, the developments that occurred later on proved that opposition was 
only permitted to the extent that it does not cross the accepted boundaries, and 
opposition’ s role in promoting freedom of speech was continuously controlled and 
threatened by government interference, generated by regional pressures.
There are still, however, distinct attempts to regain the freedom previously 
enjoyed by the media. These are constant, coming from opposition forces and certain 
more vocal journalists. For example, the Lebanese parliamentary elections in September 
2000 showed one more time an unpredictable and independent trend that some Lebanese 
journalists still have despite the pressures. For the longest time, Syrian-Lebanese 
relations were considered a taboo issue, one of two red lines for the Lebanese press, the 
other one being current President Emile Lahoud. Other red lines are still present, even 
though not as strong in their effect on incurring censorship. These are Hezbollah’s 
legitimacy as a resistance backed by Iran and Syria, the Palestinian cause, and Saudi 
Arabia and its ruling family. However, during the 2000 parliamentary elections, An- 
Nahar's publisher and Editor-in-chief Jibran Tueni wrote a strong editorial calling for a 
reassessment o f bilateral relations between Lebanon and Syria and advocating a more 
equal partnership, (Kraidy, 2000) a demand that was discussed only in private circles, and 
was considered a typically Christian demand. The effect this editorial had on the 
Lebanese political and journalistic realm was so strong to the extent that during the 
electoral campaign of the months of August and September, even Lebanese politicians of
55
all political groups began calling for revision of Lebanese-Syrian relations, w ith the 
Lebanese media covering these developments very closely. Tensions began to increase 
furthermore in September 2000, when the Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir 
made cutting comments and asked Syria to withdraw its troops from  Lebanon during an 
interview with the BBC. (Kraidy, 2000) Relayed on BBC radio and heard throughout the 
Arab world, the patriarch's comments induced a forceful response from  the Syrian 
information minister, who criticized those opposed to Syria's presence in Lebanon. It 
also reached countless o f exiled Lebanese and interest groups that supported this idea and 
saw this as a sign to go forward in their demand.
In addition to the BBC and other foreign sources, Lebanese stations such as LBCI 
covered the story closely, leading to a power struggle within the station to control news 
about bilateral relations between Lebanon and Syria. However, such stories often turn 
into a sectarian mess once the local stations come into play and are often seen as holding 
sectarian views: for example, in the case o f LBCI, criticism was voiced against the station 
for holding “ anti-Lebanese”  views, a criticism often directed towards the Christian 
denomination, and in particular the Maronites, leading the channel to step back and 
carefully study its selection o f news and their content. Moreover, the Syrian occupation 
began to be measured w ith Lebanese nationalism, with Chief o f Parliament Nabih Berry 
proclaiming that the Syrian troops w ill only get out of Lebanon “ over my dead body,”  
and Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah gathering up his Shiite supporters to proclaim 
that the real majority does not want Syria out of Lebanon just yet, and so the trend 
created by Tueni soon calmed down, though it never totally disappeared.
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This example demonstrates the power o f transnational media to expose political 
discourse by taking it public on the airwaves. However, there still exist an assortment o f 
legal and less legal control mechanisms on Arab media and the Lebanese television in 
particular, however independent it may seem to be. Government interaction w ith the 
media still dictates the content and language of media, because of the close economic and 
political relationship these two have. Hariri's influence on media and politics, fo r 
example, polarizes the Lebanese political, business, and media circles, as most people 
have either celebrated or unmistakably expressed rejection to his reappointment as prime 
minister in 2000. His dual status as both player, as a media mogul, and arbitrator, as 
prime minister, is a very striking example o f how media and politics interact. As V ice 
President o f the National Media Council Marwan Shalak described it, (personal 
communication, August 2003) whenever a politician owns or proxy owns shares o f a 
certain television stations, one can be sure that the latter w ill be influenced by the former 
in various forms and ways. NBN’s CEO Nasser Safieddine describes it in a different way: 
“ It is only natural that not to take positions to make these people unhappy, after all they 
finance the company.” (Personal communication, August 2003) Even though this 
statement is true to any company in general, the effect that this statement has on 
Lebanese media is drastic: because the elites monopolize the economic and political 
power in Lebanon, the content of media becomes a mere projection of what this power 
wants to broadcast. In this context, the m u ltip lic ity  o f media outlets becomes a mere 
playground for political elites and loses its role as a Public Sphere.
Moreover, not only being in a pro-government television defines the content o f 
this television among certain predetermined lines. As the case of NTV shows, being in
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the lines o f opposition against a certain political figure also determines news selection: 
since N T V ’ s owner Tahseen Khayyat is known to be against Rafik Hariri in particular, 
much o f N T V ’s news content is focused to the economic situation, and how Hariri’ s 
yearly budgets and policies are only worsening the situation. As a matter o f fact, the 
word on the Lebanese street is that NTV is the “ economy station,”  while LBC I is more 
often than not seen as the “ Maronite station”  or the “ Entertainment station,”  depending 
on the po litica l situation. Among the government side, Future T V  is often referred to as 
“ Harin station,”  while NBN (National Broadcasting News) is iron ically termed “ Nabih 
Berry N etw ork,”  referring to the chief o f parliament whose fam ily and entourage 
combined own more than 40% of the shares. This only goes to show how much 
cred ib ility  these stations have lost over the years o f their existence. The audience already 
knows what to expect when watching a particular television, and thus the whole idea of 
the media generating thoughtful discussion becomes obsolete. Though the journalists 
themselves need not be allied directly to the owner’ s or shareholders’ ideology, they do 
not have complete control over the content of their w ork because they themselves have 
self-censorship mechanisms that they use to protect themselves.
Preserving Lebanon’s Image
In addition, w ith the recent violence between Palestinians and Israelis, the war on 
Iraq, the pressures on Syria, and Lebanon's looming economic recession, the Lebanese 
government is most probably expected to play a delicate balancing act, keeping a vigilant 
eye on satellite broadcasters in particular in an attempt to control Lebanon's image in the 
Arab world. This is a role that is not only demanded by Lebanese officia ls but also by 
different regional players. Firstly, Syria is more and more wary o f the Lebanese
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discourse on whether Syrian m ilitary forces should withdraw from  the Lebanese 
territories. It intends to keep its presence in Lebanon as an ultimate resource in its peace 
negotiations with Israel, and thus does not want this discourse gaining any more 
importance than it already has, especially with the introduction o f the Syria 
Accountability Act that includes withdrawal from Lebanon as a necessary step towards 
bettering relations w ith the United States. Secondly, Saudi Arabia is wary o f discussing 
any of its national matters on satellite television, especially with the growing effect the 
Jihadists and reformists are having on Saudi Arabia’ s internal discourse, and the fear of 
any attempt on toppling the Saud ruling family.
Therefore, the po litica l forces that have shaped the emerging satellite industry 
remain problematic fo r that industry’ s growth, not only in the Lebanese arena but in the 
whole Arab world. And, even though satellite television did undermine state control of 
television flows by transmitting programs from other Arab countries that are more open 
in certain social trends and traditions, it did not achieve the same effect on the political 
level, maybe with the exception o f Al-Jazeera, which is more news-oriented and 
relatively less constrained in its political coverage. NBN’s Safieddine explains the need 
for state control by saying that there is no need to display “ our internal cuisine”  to 
potential tourists and investors, and discuss the electricity company’ s scandal or the 
polluted beaches in front o f viewers from around the world, and sees censorship in that 
sense as a great tool to encourage tourism in Lebanon, which is one o f the main resources 
the country actually has. He sees that criticizing Saudi Arabia, for example, w ill only 
result in less tourist in flu x  and less investments. He also sees the Syrian predicament as a 
necessary reality that w il l  not end until the war with Israel o ffic ia lly  ends. This is a
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position defended by many officials in the government as well as Lebanese businessmen 
and others.
Idealists see developments such as the case o f Al-Jazeera as the precursor o f a 
pan-Arab civil society unshackled from government censorship. They view satellite 
television in the Arab world as a threat to the regimes themselves, along with the advent 
of the Internet. In this logic, satellite television talk-shows, as well as news, all serve as a 
catalyst for a democratic renewal, where Arab audience members would mobilize as 
citizens and become increasingly interested in participation in democratic politics. 
(Kraidy, 2000) The reality of the situation, however, is that most governments in the 
region that have allowed a level o f freedom in satellite televisions still exercise 
considerable power, even i f  im plicitly. And Lebanon is no exception, even though it 
relatively enjoys more freedom than others.
Indirect Control of an Uncontrollable Medium
Indirect control of privately owned media companies takes different shapes. In 
Lebanon, most members of the board o f LBC are associated with the Syrian regime, and 
thus the station is always limited by po litica lly sensitive issues that it cannot address. 
According to documents provided by the National Council for Media, (Shalak, Marwan, 
personal communication, August 2003) Suleiman Franjieh and Issam Fares own each ten 
percent o f LB C I’ s shares. Both parliamentary deputies and ministers, their link to Syria 
is obvious through the extent of their power in politics. Moreover, the division of the 
shares among family members further makes the channel more politically oriented 
towards one main pattern: Sheikh Pierre Daher owns nine percent of the shares of LBCI, 
while his brother Sheikh Marcel Daher owns ten percent, and his wife owns one percent.
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And, even though L B C I’ s shares are separate from  terrestrial LBC , the fact that most 
newscasts and po litica l program are the same give terrestrial ownership and affilia tion a 
great deal o f  leverage when choosing news content. As a matter o f fact, only LB C I is 
changing this dependence pattern among Lebanese television: it  has created a bureau for 
satellite news, and has affiliated itse lf w ith A1 Hayat. However, it  continues to broadcast 
its local news broadcast for the purpose o f reaching interested Lebanese immigrants 
abroad, and thus s till mixes terrestrial issues w ith  the broader satellite issues.
Such an ownership pattern is also seen in the other television stations, such as 
Future Television: H a rir i’ s w ife owns 10% o f the shares, w h ile  his sister Bahiya Hariri -a 
deputy at the parliament- owns another 10%. Ghaleb Abdel L a tif Shamaa, one o f the 
most prom inent counselors and businessman closely related to R afik  H anri, owns 9.9%, 
while R a fik  H a rir i’ s children, Saadeddme and Bahaeddine, each own 8%. To top it all, 
even his brother-in-law  owns 7.3% o f the shares, which totals 51.3% o f the television 
owned by the H ariri fam ily  alone. (Shalak, M arwan, personal communication, August 
2003) A rtic le  IV , clause 13 o f the audiovisual law  o f 1994 clearly lim its  the acquiring of 
shares in any media institutions, though the Lebanese po litica l system has found other 
ways to contro l what the station broadcasts.9 The law specifies that one person cannot 
acquire more than 10% o f the total shares, but it  does not address the fact that people 
from the same po litica l or business affilia tion or from  one extended fam ily  often find 
ways to contro l bigger shares o f each station.
W h ile  several countries, such as Bahrain, Jordan, and Qatar, have been discussing 
the e lim ination  o f the ir Information M inistries, Lebanon’ s M in is te r o f Information is
9 The O ffic ia l Document o f the Terrestrial Audiovisual Law #382
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being rendered irrelevant by the intervention of state security agencies in the daily 
operations of the media, under the excuse of enforcing laws and regulations. Moreover, 
the Minister of Information is given the power to decide whether a certain station is 
abiding to the rules according to the 1994 audiovisual law, though most o f the time 
decisions to shut down or punish a station are done through other means. This is in spite 
of assurances by the current Lebanese administration that it  would protect media 
freedoms, and despite the clear wording of the press and audiovisual laws that state that 
freedom of the press should be respected fully, while taking into consideration laws and 
regulations.10 The closure o f M urr Television by security forces on September 4, 2002, 
revealed some of these troublesome trends: the Minister of Information, Ghazi A rid i, was 
not informed of the decision, and objected to it in strong terms. Moreover, the National 
Media Council was not consulted with and also received the news w ith  utmost surprise 
and shock. Also, since the Audio-Visual Law would not condone the station’s closure, 
authorities resorted to the Law o f Publications and the Elections Law to justify  the 
crackdown. A court ruled that M T V  harmed relations with Syria, undermined the dignity 
of the Lebanese president and broadcast illegal electoral propaganda. (Kraidy, 2002)
Creative interpretation and enforcement of the law is thus an instrument of 
political control even in the Arab world’s supposedly most liberal countries. The 
suspension provoked an outcry over fears for public freedoms and rifts within the 
government, with four ministers boycotting the weekly cabinet session which newspapers 
criticized for failing to address the issue.11 Thus, multiple layers o f censorship persist. In
10 Ibid.
11 Agence France Press
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addition to the control that Syria exercises over Lebanese affairs, and the limitations on 
free speech carried over from the Penal Code and Press Law to the Audiovisual Media 
Law, individual stations impose unwritten restrictions of their own, because of an array 
o f pressures that they predict or encounter. The idea that a satellite television station 
would create a venue that goes beyond regular government attempts of control and would 
foster the creation of a critical and analytical audience seems like a theory that has yet to 
be implemented in the real dealings that occur between government and media. In the 
Lebanese example, media seems to be caught in the middle of forces that go beyond c iv il 
society and are more elitist in their structure and format.
What’ s more, even the Saudi and G ulf Sheikhs who usually have shares in 
stations such as MBC and ART -which are Saudi stations by excellence-, have business 
and personal links to Lebanon's LBCI and Future TV. The satellite television law that 
was introduced in 1996 gave more leeway to the lim its o f ownership previously set up for 
terrestrial stations. In fact, law number 531 that appeared in the official magazine number 
33 on 29/7/96 licensed satellite companies follow ing the recommendations put by the 
telecommunication minister, and does not totally abide by the rule of terrestrial 
broadcasting. In fact, although it still abides to clause 4 o f the audiovisual law o f 1994, 
which states that the information minister has power over the content and broadcast o f 
these stations, it does not follow the 10% lim it in ownership and does not specify 
Lebanese nationality as a criterion to own shares in a satellite company. (Francis, Tony, 
personal communication, February 15, 2004) For example, Sheikh Walid Bin Talal from  
Saudi Arabia owns shares in terrestrial LBC, and was even naturalized through his 
mother to achieve the conditions of ownership, something that is usually inconceivable
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since women cannot give their Lebanese citizenship to their offspring. (Personal 
communication, August, 2003) Moreover, Sheikh Walid Bin Talal recently purchased a 
49 percent stake in the satellite broadcasting arm of the Lebanese Broadcasting 
Corporation (LBC) for $98 million, a transaction made possible from the fact that the 
one-page law that regulates satellite televisions does not lim it ownership to a certain 
percentage.12 In addition, NTV announced in the beginning of 2004 that it w ill be selling 
its satellite shares to Qatari princes not yet named, in order to expand and diversify its 
scope to reach a more regionally-oriented level of news. This step, in addition to Bin 
Talal’ s latest purchase and LBCI’s merger with Al-Hayat at the end o f 2003, signify a 
new era for these satellite televisions, whereby limitations w ill go beyond the local to the 
regional, while at the same time strengthening their ratings and news content in face of 
rising competition. In fact, government interference on the Lebanese level would pale in 
comparison to the more complex control mechanisms used by monarchies such as Saudi 
Arabia, and image concerns would become more astute due to the fact that businessmen 
not only have media outlets, but also investments they want to protect and promote.
Clearly, politicians in the region consider the printed and seen word extremely 
powerful, or they would not be so determined to silence their critics or try to buy them 
out. Given widespread illiteracy in many Arab countries and the undisputed potency of 
the television image, the stakes in television censorship are even higher. Where Penal 
Codes, codes of ethics or straightforward government censorship fail to achieve the 
desired effect, the authorities have shown that television journalists are liable to receive 
the same treatment given to newspaper journalists throughout history. Therefore,
12 A1 Iktissad Wal Aamal Group
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journalists are driven more and more to watch what they publish or broadcast under the 
threat of detention and imprisonment for a variety of reasons. W ith such an armory of 
methods still in use for inducing self-censorship, satellite channels w ill not be the 
instrument that erodes censorship in terrestrial television especially that it is linked the 
latter by headquarters, journalists, and news content. As a matter o f fact, for this to 
happen, a change in political systems themselves is required. As members of UNESCO, 
Arab governments are party to the Sanaa Declaration, adopted by the 29th session of the 
UNESCO General Conference in Paris in 1997. This enjoins them to end censorship and 
the intimidation o f media professionals and to grant statutes of editorial independence to 
their state broadcasters and news agencies. (Sakr, 2002) This has yet to be implemented, 
as is the case of many other laws that have been stipulated or ratified along the years.
In the Lebanese experience, the government is not as forceful in exercising 
control over freedom o f information, but it is getting less and less im plic it lately, despite 
the technological revolution o f information. Still, Lebanese satellite televisions have 
learned their lessons from  the terrestrial experience, and operate accordingly. This 
convenient setup has allowed television stations a certain degree of freedom while at the 
same time lim iting them on the kind of reports they broadcast. Thus, although LBCI is a 
mouthpiece for the Maronite in Lebanon, the fact that some shares are owned by some 
pro-Syrians makes it more lim ited by some sensitive issues it cannot address. In an 
answer to my question on the degree of freedom NBN television has, NBN director 
Nasser Safieddine said, “ It  is only a show of respect to our shareholders not to broadcast 
news that would be harmful to them.”  (Personal communication, August 2003) In his 
point of view, this is not a lim itation of freedom but a consensus already accepted.
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However, this "show of respect" is practiced in a wide array of examples, and not only 
when it affects a certain shareholder. New TV, owned by a competitor to PM Rafik Hariri 
Tahseen Khayyat, had to withhold from showing a talk show that criticizes Saudi Arabia 
because of pressures from Hariri himself to close down the station. NTV news director 
M iriam El-Bassam insists the reason for the channel’s compliance with what the 
government “ advised” them to do was a pure strategic one: to her and other journalists, it 
was a matter of prioritizing and deciding how to tackle certain issues. (Personal 
communication, August, 2003) Under the threat o f being shut down, this is the strategy 
most channels pursue; they tone down their controversial stances in order to gain more 
ground in other more important issues to them. In fact, N TV ’s news director considered 
local issues more important than broadcasting a talk show about opposition in Saudi 
Arabia, and thus preferred to opt for compliance rather than confrontation, and keep the 
medium open for more local issues than regional ones. The case of NTV also showed the 
degree of interference the government has on satellite television: because of internal 
tensions between the prime minister and the president, the fate o f NTV proved to be less 
tragic: though NTV was shut down on the orders o f the prime minister, the president 
ordered it should be opened again as a political show of strength, and NTV was spared 
the fate of Murr TV.
Murr TV did not have the same luck even though the prime minister in this case 
tried his best to re-open it: in an offic ia l court order, Murr TV was shut down by 
hundreds of internal security forces, and was denied several appeals to re-open it 
throughout 2001 and 2002. The reason fo r the shutdown was different than that o f N TV : 
it was not based on censorship or preserving relations with a friendly country, but
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supposedly on local elections. This time the government used a far more powerful tool to 
silence an opposition voice that was becoming more vocal, which is the power of the 
jud iciary branch, bypassing the National Media Council and other Media committees, as 
always. The reasons for the shutdown were clear: the owner o f M urr T V  had just won a 
very controversial seat in the parliament, and furthermore had a television station and a 
radio to voice his opposition. However, the o ffic ia l reasons were that Gabriel Murr used 
his media to campaign for himself, something that is forbidden under the elections law. 
This was being practiced by every station at that time, but was still used as a pretext to 
silence the opposition.
A lso, in this case, it became apparent that the reasons fo r shutdown were not only 
political, but also due to external pressures, because the television station was strongly 
opposing the Syrian army’s presence in Lebanon fo r more than 20 years. Many 
opposition figures criticized this move as a pure show o f force on the part o f the Syrian 
government, and a clear submission from the part o f the Lebanese government. In this 
instance, the government used the most indirect means to censor media, through 
bypassing the m inistry o f information, and the audiovisual law, and justifying the 
crackdown by resorting to the elections law. Consultant Marwan Shalak of the National 
Media Council condemned this as a purely politica l move, and criticized the government 
for not resorting to the body who is supposed to decide upon these cases, which is the 
national media council itself, put in place iron ica lly  by the same government that is 
bypassing it. (Personal communication, August, 2003) This is a perfect example of the 
extent to which the Lebanese and consequently the Syrian government allow freedom of 
speech and the voicing of differing opinions on national and cross-boundaries television.
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This trend is not particular to Murr TV ; in fact, multiple layers o f censorship exist, 
and are justified not only by the audiovisual law, but also by the penal code, the election 
law, and the publications law, to which the audiovisual law refers to extensively. In 
addition, individual stations impose restrictions on themselves to avoid confrontation 
with the government, which creates a web of limitations on the freedom o f expression, 
which the audiovisual law defends, so vehemently in its first clause. The examples 
mentioned above are just a part o f the current attempts that the government made to lim it 
the power of television, and especially the satellite ones that have a w ider coverage. The 
government has always realized the importance of mass media, and recognized the 
responsibilities and burden that satellite television added to the equation, because of 
external as well as internal considerations. Moreover, the Syrian role in this example also 
makes itself clear, as w ell as its interference in elections and their outcomes.
Ever since the firs t publication law and up until the audiovisual law o f 1994, the 
first and foremost concern for the Lebanese government has been to take care o f not 
upsetting its neighbors. In article seven, clause 2 of the audiovisual law 13, it  is stated that 
it is not permitted to air news that affect national security and national interests, but the 
law is vague on what exactly constitutes these interests, and lately the interest o f the 
Lebanese government has been to please Syria as well as any potential Arab investor. 
Throughout the past decade, the government has shut down institutions temporarily on 
the ground that they are destabilizing national security, which can range from  airing news 
on an internal religious issue or criticizing the Syrian government. In fact, at the 
beginning satellite televisions were not permitted to air political news whatsoever. When
13 The Official Document o f the Terrestrial Audiovisual Law #382
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LBCI challenged the ban and aired political programs, a “ special censorship”  team was 
put in place to enforce the ban. LBC I managed to challenge the government’ s decision 
by going to court, and won the battle. However, as it proved later on, this was not the 
only obstacle satellite televisions had to face, and the battle still goes on to this day. W ith 
Syria being the main power broker in Lebanon, it does not matter how many media 
outlets the Lebanese people have, because they all fall under one tent, which is a pro- 
Syrian government and consequently a lo t o f red lines that media is not supposed to cross.
Media as a Projection of Lebanese Affairs
The Lebanese media situation is an example of the contradictory state o f 
transformation and stagnation that Lebanon is going through since the end o f the c iv il 
war. The existing media laws specify that television institutions may not be directly 
managed or run by the government or private individuals or politicians. The practice, 
however, is different but congruent w ith the special socio-political structure o f the 
Lebanese society. An examination o f the development o f television in Lebanon suggests 
that the measures taken by government to regulate television broadcasting since its 
inception in Lebanon were not intended to encourage television officials to deal w ith 
themes of significant concern to the average individual, mainly those emerging from  the 
c iv il war. Themes that deal with the need for the cooperation of the different sectarian 
groups in the reconstruction of the country and in bringing about the unity o f its people 
are almost absent in Lebanese television. In fact, the different government legislations 
that were introduced aimed neither at promoting original productions, nor at providing 
more opportunity for local talent and developing responsible and professional 
organizational structures. Moreover, themes that deal with election reform, Syrian
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m ilitary presence, or the religious political system are often penalized or censored for the 
sake o f “ national security.”  As a matter o f fact, state legislation in the area of television 
broadcasting is aimed at allowing government officia ls and the ruling political bosses to 
exploit this medium for their own political goals.
The assessment of the growth of television in Lebanon shows that government 
officia ls and political bosses endeavored to legalize their monopoly over television news 
and what might threaten their political ambitions or the status quo. Additionally, its 
control over programs shows that the friction between television authorities with the 
government during the past four decades was due to the interest o f the television officials 
in financial and political gain more than their interest in securing increased freedom to 
produce programs that address themes relevant to the social and economic problems that 
are confronting the country. No serious investigation has been carried out by the media 
about claims of corruption in the government, which was often voiced by senior 
government officials, despite the fact that there exist a number o f opposition televisions 
that would be interested in this theme. Instead, opposition televisions such as NTV and 
LB C I have lim ited themselves to criticize on person in the government, thus weakening 
their cred ib ility  among viewers and distracting them from  the bigger issues.
Additionally, no serious program, to date, has been produced to deal with the 
sectarian conflict that plagues the country. In fact, even though one of NBN ’s critically 
acclaimed programs goes under the name of “ Lebanon’ s Sects,”  the program limits itself 
to introducing those sects to the viewers, a good informative step still not tackling the 
issues at stake. In addition, when a worker at the Education M inistry killed eight of his 
co-workers in a mad rage in the summer of 2002, LB C I’ s coverage of the tragedy
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consisted of criticizing the fact that six of these eight workers were Christian, while the 
killer was Muslim, and im plied that this was a sectarian crime. N TV, on the other hand, 
implied that the reason fo r this heinous crime was Hariri’s bad economic policies which 
drove the poor man to madness, which is typically what the audience expects these two 
stations to do. This, among other examples, shows to what extent the New as well as Old 
Public Spheres are engaging c iv il society into constructive and critical discussions. The 
fact is, in the current media structure, there is no room for freedom o f expression of 
opinion. It is only through a reform o f the media itself that c iv il society can start using 
this outlet to reach a vaster audience and attain the desired effect this new technology 
supposedly produces.
Restructuring the Media
The main problem facing broadcasting in Lebanon is a double-edged sword. It is 
primarily one o f both the government and media institutions lacking the adequate 
structures that would provide the opportunity for this medium to contribute to its society's 
unity and cohesion as w ell as to address issues that are relevant to the every day life of 
the average citizen. Instead, this medium gives prevailing interest to commercialism at 
the expense of professionalism and social responsibility. It is also focused on criticizing 
one factor affecting Lebanese affairs at the expense of giving the whole journalistically 
objective picture. As a matter o f fact, news programs focus mainly on news of politicians, 
with little reflective coverage o f issues that concern the general public. For example, 
when Marcel Ghanem’ s “ Kalam El Nass” (People Talk) invited Finance minister Fouad 
Sanioura to a surprise meeting w ith a fam ily way below the line o f poverty (Kalam el 
Nass, 2004), the questions were more limited to pinning down the minister in general
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instead of asking him to defend and explain his budget plan that does not help the poor in 
any material way.
Examining the content o f television programs one gets the impression that 
television officials believe that their viewers w ill accept whatever is given to them and, 
therefore, do not feel the necessity to make more effort to provide them with content that 
addresses their needs for information about issues that concern their livelihood and that 
are relevant to their daily concerns. This has lead television stations to air low quality 
entertainment programs and talk shows that may entertain the average audience but does 
not appeal to their mind or meet their intellectual and developmental needs.
It is true that the Lebanese government has hampered the growth of television and 
kept broadcasting in a state o f stagnation. It is also true that Lebanese television today, 
especially the type depicted on the satellite channels, is a melange of various inconsistent 
programs, policies and structures, predominantly foreign in orientation and barely 
relevant to the needs of Lebanese society or Arab world. I f  one examines the content o f 
these satellite channels one finds the follow ing: Television soap operas that come from 
Egypt, Syria, and Latin America; ta lk shows which usually host a discussant and a 
political or economic personality, w ith a discussant frequently biased towards one 
opinion and consequently attacking or complimenting the guest on their acts; 
entertainment programs in the form o f contests and games that saturate satellite channels 
heavily; as well as imported movies and series from different regions. Nevertheless, 
there were and still are to some extent some satirical programs that make fun o f the 
current political or social situation, but these too were deemed too daring by the Lebanese 
government: as a matter of fact, as o f January 2004, the government issued an order to
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stop airing “ Basmat Watan,”  (A Nation’s Smiles, or When a Nation Died, depending on 
how the sentence is worded) under the pretext of, once again, harming relations with a 
neighboring country.14 Still, there is a growing awareness among journalists and 
producers o f the importance of the medium in tackling important issues. For example, 
poverty was one of the most recurring themes that filled LBCFs programming during the 
Christmas holidays of 2003. However, the programming consisted of giving out aid to 
needy families and looked more like a “ makeover”  program than a serious one that 
discusses the roots and solutions to this alarming and growing phenomenon.
Prior to the advent of satellite broadcasting in Lebanon and other third world 
countries television broadcasting constituted a lim ited local problem: it was restricted to 
few channels for a moderate capacity audience. It is true that national audiences then had 
to watch programs that were controlled by censors "to protect the interests of the 
country." Today, however, with satellite broadcasting, the national audiences are at the 
mercy o f tens of satellite stations whose broadcasters continuously bombard them with 
low culture and a variety of low quality programs. Lebanese television broadcasting is in 
urgent need for reorganization in order to cope w ith the role it is expected to play in the 
reconstruction of a country that has suffered from a long and costly civil war. While the 
government is in need to provide the climate o f freedom that is conducive for the 
broadcasting medium, the broadcasters need to be committed to their social responsibility 
and to developing a well-trained corps of professionals in the different fields of television 
production.(Dajani, 2001). Moreover, television and government officials need to be 
separate from each other in terms of interest and affiliation, in order to give the television 
the objectivity and professionalism it needs to thrive in a competitive world. Today, 
14 From  A ssa fir Newspaper, December 2003
73
there are numerous attempts to modernize the traditional means o f communication that 
Lebanon has been plagued with ever since its founding, and one o f them is the recent 
merger between LB C I and Al-Hayat, which resulted in an expansion o f bureaus and 
access for LBCI, and thus raised its professional commitment to report the news without 
restrictions. However, with an increasing tendency o f government interference, 
television w ill always be lim ited in news reporting, especially when this interference is 
growing in intensity and directness: on December 6, 2003, the owner o f New TV  was 
arrested for allegedly harboring illegal links with Israel, and was released a day later 
though he remains under investigation according to court sources15. Tahseen Khayyat 
was arrested in his office by m ilitary police on charges of harboring illegal links with 
Israel and damaging Beirut's Relations with neighboring countries, and was accused of 
meeting with Israeli o ffic ia ls in Qatar. The fact that he was released the follow ing day 
shows that the whole move was political. In fact, his arrest was denounced by former PM 
Hoss and the media, link ing  it  to his NTV's hard-hitting coverage o f a money-laundering 
probe at Lebanon's A l-M adina bank, saying it was intended to intim idate NTV into 
silence and stop its investigations. This latest attack on freedom was a hard-hitting 
reality to many of those who were hoping for an increased freedom o f voicing opinions 
and digging through issues that affect public opinion and people’ s livelihood, but was 
still a living proof that the government is not ready to let down its guard concerning 
satellite freedoms.
A1 Manar Television might be the only exception to the fate that awaits 
opposition televisions in Lebanon: a propaganda tool for the Hezbollah resistance, Manar
15 Agence France Presse
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TV has been vocal of its opposition to participate in the Lebanese government, 
considering it a corrupted institution that does not represent the people. Not one 
Hezbollah deputy has ever been minister in any o f the Lebanese cabinets follow ing the 
Ta if agreement, and the party is very adamant until today in its decision not to participate 
in anything other than representative elections. In addition to its controversial position as 
the only war m ilitia that still has the right to hold guns, and due to the fact that Syria and 
Iran are main regional brokers that support Hezbollah, A1 Manar TV has managed to 
maintain a relative liberty in showing programs that might be frowned upon i f  they were 
broadcast somewhere else, like controversial Syrian production that criticize Israel and 
the United States. A1 Manar TV  also airs programs that show Hollywood movies, while 
criticizing them by showing their stereotypes towards the Arab community. W hile this 
might be seen differently if  it were shown on other channels, A1 Manar TV  defends itself 
w ith the support of regional powers, in addition to its powerful role as a national 
resistance and supporter of the Palestinian cause. Al-Manar's website describes its 
mission as follows: "Lebanese TV  channels have been overwhelmed by a trend o f movies 
and programs that can only be described as immoral. A t the time when the Lebanese - 
such as any people coming out o f a devastating war- needed what could erase the effects 
o f that conflict and work on building the personality o f good citizenship, numerous T V  
channels have been broadcasting programs that would decay one's ethics and provoke his 
or her instincts in addition to instigating violence and identifying with western liv ing  
patterns which are quite remote from our Islamic and Eastern values and culture.” 16
15 From  h ttp //w w w .almanar.com.lb
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Despite the fact that televisions in Lebanon have differing characteristics and 
cater to different tastes and backgrounds, there is still no constructive discourse that 
would enable c iv il society in Lebanon to analyze and discuss a unified, or at least a 
representative image of Lebanon that all of the population can agree upon. Furthermore, 
until this day no independent voices have been able to gain access to these mass media, 
and by independent I refer to those not affiliated w ith wealthy opposition businessmen or 
wealthy pro-government businessmen. As a matter o f fact, the only discourse that has 
occurred w ithin mass media until this day has happened on the elitist level, leaving the 
rest o f the population at the mercy of censorship or lack o f televised access. It is this 
reality that has plagued Lebanese television since its inception and one that hinders the 
efforts fo r democratization in its fu ll form.
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CONCLUSION
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Media scholars often address the relationship between government and television 
in the context of either a western societal structure where this medium usually operates 
within the private sector, or a third world structure where the medium customarily 
operates within the public sector, typically as a government arm. Lebanese media 
institutions, however, do not f it either the third world model nor the western model of 
media operation, because it is the existing societal forces in every state that determine the 
structure, content and operation o f media institutions. The mass media, therefore, are 
unique to their society, and come into existence as result of the existent civil society and 
community structure, not as a catalyst to the creation of a new one. They cannot have 
identity or effects without the influence o f the concrete instances within which the 
different forces operate. Lebanon is a curious country with many contradictions, 
pluralism and deep divisions. It is a society fragmented along sectarian lines, and is 
currently going through a search fo r identity: its institutions are tom between change, 
which is exhibited in its relatively modem laws and perspective, and that o f stagnation, 
which is demonstrated by the performance of its political and religious traditional 
leadership who put obstacles in the introduction o f change or application of laws that may 
lessen the sectarian nature o f the system o f government.
M y point is that the impact o f the New Public Sphere on civil society might not be 
as influential as some analysts have predicted it to be, or at least not yet. The growth o f 
this new form of communication is relatively new, and is still deeply connected to the 
traditional state of affairs. Furthermore, the interaction between the New Media and c iv il 
society cannot be described as one that is encouraging or permitting democratization and 
freedom of speech, because o f the political and economic structure that directly
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influences the New Media. In other words, it is more accurate to say that the New Media 
is a projection of the Lebanese political discourse, w ith all its omissions and censored 
components. Also, the New Media, in the way it is structured today, is fortifying the 
traditional power structure rather than criticizing it, and in some cases it even emulates 
the establishment in the format of its control mechanisms.
Even though transnational media can strengthen a certain discourse by taking it 
out on the regional and international level, it does not mean that transnational media can 
go beyond the local limitations. Just because a media is transnational in its essence does 
not mean that the rules that apply to it are very different from the terrestrial media. In fact, 
being a satellite television seems to have more limitations than a terrestrial one, 
especially because of the fact that it reaches people beyond boundaries. The 
responsibility becomes bigger and the censorship greater, because the government not 
only wants to keep the people under control, but also the country’ s image under control, 
which means that content and style must be constantly monitored to preserve this 
idealistic image a country like Lebanon should have. Moreover, it is not only Lebanon’s 
image that plays a role in determining satellite television content in the Arab world. With 
the advent o f reality shows inspired by their Western counterparts, like Future T V ’s 
“ Superstar,”  LB C I’ s “ Star Academy,”  and the ill-fated “ Big Brother”  on MBC, optimists 
started hoping that change might indeed come from  across the boundaries. However, “ Is 
the region's tight moral yam starting to unwind? No way, say viewers and producers - not 
while satellite TV  has to cater to the social codes o f 22 Arab nations.”  (Farah, 2004)
Also, the study showed that the voices behind the new mass media do not differ in 
its content and essence from the terrestrial media already put in place. In addition, media
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ownership still fo llows the structure put in place by satellite’ s predecessors. The study 
also shows that the difference between satellite and terrestrial content is m inimal, and do 
little to promote democratization and much less critical thinking that goes beyond the red 
lines already put in place. Satellite television is thus playing the traditional role of 
promoting political agenda for the benefit of the political and economic ruling elite, 
which goes counter the theories put forward by Adorno, Brecht, Sartre, and others. 
Moreover, even Habermas’ bourgeois approach cannot be compared to the elitist 
approach the Lebanese elites have towards media. As a matter o f fact, Habermas’ 
bourgeoisie confronted the aristocratic status quo, even i f  its scope did not go beyond this 
particular class. In the Lebanese case, the elites hold the po litica l, religious, and 
economic power, and furthermore they control the majority o f the communication means, 
which implies that those w ith less fortune can do little to change the current state of 
affairs.
The New Public Sphere that has been created by satellite televisions in Lebanon 
did not quite go beyond the usual terrestrial boundaries as was expected by some 
observers. In fact, my point is that all that it helped to do was provide the government 
with more excuses and incentives to censor and tone down the opposition. The disillusion 
that media has provoked among Lebanese is only part o f the more general disillusion that 
the Lebanese political structure engenders, because media is and remains a part o f the 
political body. For this to change, the audiovisual law needs to be respected by both the 
government and the satellite television stations alike. Moreover, the satellite television 
law needs to be addressed and revised, instead of relying on a one-page law that links 
satellite television stations w ith all kinds o f other media and other laws. This cannot be
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done, however, without a change in the political structure itself, thus it needs to be done 
first by a change from within society, because this is where the public sphere ultimately 
exists in its entirety. Media can be an effective tool for social movements, but it  remains a 
tool that can be manipulated by anybody who has the power and means to do it. In the 
case o f Lebanon, there is little leeway on how much media can force change on the 
political landscape, especially because of its close connection with this landscape in the 
first place. The only way it can disassociate itself from politics and would be by 
becoming financially independent, as well as by disassociating itself from its terrestrial 
counterparts.
Actually, for a real liberalization of the medium to happen, it must entail a change 
in the political system first, and a change in the social structure and what people perceive 
as the root of the problem is. And this cannot happen through the effect o f the media, 
because of its lingering relationship with the political structure itself. Moreover, no 
change is possible with the different satellite television channels relying mostly on 
private capital to sustain its existence. W ith the economic recession and a lack of 
advertising revenue, these channels are doomed to remain under the stronghold o f their 
local shareholders, and w ill not be able to overcome their limitations. Lebanon is a 
country o f many contradictions, w ith  a severe identity crisis: it is both a country that is 
trying to modernize its institutions, and one that is clinging to the traditional balance of 
power. The measures taken by government officials throughout Lebanon’ s existence 
were aimed not at promoting change, but at making sure the real issues are not dealt with. 
In fact, until this day, few attempts have been made to analyze the c iv il war or the 
religious tensions that plague this country, and anything that seems to threaten the status
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quo has been stopped in its early stages. Although Lebanon's democratic development is 
hampered by the unstable regional situation, the continued influence wielded by regional 
players over Lebanon's domestic and international politics, and the mistrust among the 
country's various religious communities, the emergence o f citizen-based movements 
outwardly critical o f the Syrian presence in the country has been seen as an encouraging 
step towards a more open political system. Public debate over media freedoms, electoral 
law and the confessional system itself, has also recently emerged and took force. In 
addition, Lebanon's vibrant and diverse civ il societies play a vital role in restoring a 
degree of authority to its citizens. Through their efforts to increase the government's 
responsiveness to citizens' needs, civil society is leading the movement for further 
democratic reform in Lebanon, keeping in mind that satellite and terrestrial television 
stations are great tools these movements can use to reach a bigger popular base and raise 
awareness, but not lim iting itself to it.
This study only tackles the beginnings o f the new phenomenon of mergers and 
expansions that these New Media are currently going through. However, these latest 
developments are o f utmost importance to further critical studies that w ill determine the 
actual impact o f satellite televisions on societies sim ilar to the Lebanese society. I also 
believe that Lebanese satellite televisions have only recently started to take upon 
themselves the role they are really supposed to play on a regional and international level, 
through putting their shares on the market and focusing on news in a credible and 
professional manner. In fact, Al-Jazeera’s success owes it first and foremost to the 
professionalism and its focus on pertinent news, (Ghadbian, 2001) two elements that until 
recently lacked from the Lebanese satellite industry. Therefore, foreign capital as well as
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tackling critical regional and international issues w ill most probably take Lebanese 
satellite into a new level, and improve the current discourse. Not relying on local capital 
might also give these news outlets increased freedom o f information and less 
governmental control. However, it is still early to determine whether satellite television 
in Lebanon w ill be able to overcome its local and regional challenges, or whether the 
coming Lebanese governments w ill find new ways to control every new technology that 
is put in place, no matter how sophisticated. Moreover, a study o f the development and 
metamorphoses o f these stations in the light o f increasing pressure and competition from 
their regional and international counterparts w ill definitely be essential in getting a fuller 
grasp of the dynamics o f the “ New,”  and “ Newer”  media.
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Appendix A:
Lebanese Broadcast Act 
October 19, 1994
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Chapter One:
Terms and Objectives 
A rtic le  One:
The objective o f this law is to organize radio and T V  transmission by any technology, 
means, or apparatus, regardless of its situation or its name, and to organize the rules and 
all matters related to this transmission.
A rtic le  Two:
For the purpose of applying this law, the terms mentioned here below have the following 
meaning:
Radio Transmission: transmission via electromagnetic waves, or any other means, that 
can be received by an audience.
TV  Transmission: the transmission of pictures on air, whether moving or otherwise, 
accompanied by audio transmission or unaccompanied, via electromagnetic wave or any 
other means, that can be received by an audience.
Channel: the frequency slot used by a TV station fo r T V  transmission.
Wave: the frequency slot used by a radio station fo r radio transmission.
TV  or radio stations: all kinds of transmitter devices, stationary or mobile, and relays and 
responders and magnifiers and all networks, whether on earth or in space, which can 
directly continue TV and radio transmission.
Re-Transmission: the acquisition of radio or TV programs wholly or in part, regardless of 
the technical means which the licensed station uses to transmit these programs to the 
audience, and re-transmitting these programs without change, live or delayed.
TV  station: any entity that organizes and transmits a TV  program to an audience, or that 
copies it  unchanged to a third party.
Radio station: any entity that organizes and transmits a radio program to an audience, or 
that copies it unchanged to a third party.
Program: A ll the service elements provided by the station, as mentioned in the previous 
section.
Advertisements: The commercials that are directed to the public, within the time frame 
granted to the advertiser, for the purpose of promoting a product or a service, or buying
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or renting it, or to propagate a certain a certain issue or opinion or induce any other effect 
the advertiser wishes to induce.
Literary, artistic, musical, scientific right owner: Any real person or entity that creates an 
achievement o f literary, artistic, musical, or scientific nature. Or that requires the 
investment rights o f such an achievement.
Chapter Two:
Article Three:
Audiovisual media are free enterprises. The freedom of the media is to be practiced 
within the framework of the constitution and the applied laws.
Article Four:
It is meant by audiovisual media, any TV and radio transmission operation that addresses 
the public or part o f it, via signals or pictures or sounds or writings o f any sort that are not 
characterized by the personal communication characteristics, through channels and waves 
and transmission devices and networks and other transmission or transmission devices or 
technologies.
Article Five:
Establishing TV  or radio stations inside the Lebanese territory or in national waters is 
subject to prior licensing.
Article Six:
It is prohibited for nay person or entity without the prior licensing to import or 
manufacture or assemble or use any transmission device or relay any audio or visual 
transmission. The authorities w ill confiscate all devices, parts and equipment that are 
imported or manufactured or used or being assembled without prior licensing. Penalties 
mentioned in the applied laws w ill be imposed on whoever violates the above rulings.
Article Seven:
The flowing matters are taken into consideration when granting a license. First: imposing 
on the station a certain technical standard for its transmission via its channel or wave, 
meeting the operational conditions or requirements, of human resources, programs, 
locations, installations, equipment, studios, and stations. Also, the station’ s ability to 
sustain its costs at least for the first year of its licensing.
Second: the respect o f the human character and the freedom of others and their rights and 
the multitude o f opinions and points o f view and the objectivity o f the news bulletins and 
keeping o f the public order and national defense requirements are all imperative.
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Third: imposing on the station the volume of local production that is determined by the 
book of conditions for each category or local production.
Fourth: stations are obliged to apply the general laws, in a way that does not conflict with 
this law.
Fifth: stations are not allowed to retain any financial gain that is not secured from its 
operations, whether directly or indirectly.
Sixth: stations are prohibited from transmitting whatever may promote relations w ith the 
Zionist enemy.
Artic le Eight:
On granting licenses it is taken into consideration that there are rights related to channels 
and airwaves that exist in Lebanon as a result o f previous agreements. These channels 
and airwaves w ill be determined and distributed according to technical criteria o f 
international standards assuring a clear and advanced transmission.
A technical committee is formed and called the TV  and Radio Transmission Organization 
Committee. This committee works in conjunction with the Minister of Information and 
consists of the Director General o f Investments at the Ministry of Information, a 
representative of the Defense M inistry, four experienced communication engineers 
appointed by a government device upon three recommendations of the Minister o f 
Information and the Minister o f Telecommunications and Post, Technical Director at 
Radio Lebanon and the Technical Director at Tele-Liban and the technical 
representatives from other TV  and Radio stations.
This committee w ill study all the technical aspects relating to TV and radio transmissions, 
and submit the necessary recommendations to the minister of Information and the 
members of the committee.
Artic le Nine:
The State is the sole and exclusive owner o f all the channels and airwaves and these 
cannot be sold or leased.
The station can utilize the channel; or airwaves by renting it according to the applied laws 
and regulation. The right to utilize an airwave or channel is not by any means an 
exclusive concession and after the end of the rent contract, no compensation right ensues 
of any kind and the rend duration is determined by the license. The TV or radio station 
has no right to sell its rental rights, wholly or in part, or even to lease them or to waive 
them, directly or indirectly. In the event o f any violation of the above, the station w ill be 
forced to cease transmission immediately.
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C hapter Three:
The classification of TV and Radio stations:
Article Ten:
TV  stations are categorized according to the following:
1. TV  stations that transmit visual programs, including news and political programs, 
and that cover all of the Lebanese territory.
2. TV stations that transmit visual programs, except news and political programs, 
and that cover all of the Lebanese territory.
3. TV  stations that transmit coded signals that can only be received by subscribers 
who process the necessary technical equipment.
4. International TV stations that transmit via satellite and whose coverage exceeds 
the Lebanese territory.
Artic le  Eleven:
Radio stations are categorized according to the following:
1. Radio stations that transmit different kinds o f programs including news and 
political programs that cover all the Lebanese territory.
2. Radio stations that transmit different kinds of programs except news and political 
programs and that cover the Lebanese territory.
3. Radio stations that transmit coded signals that can only be received by subscribers 
who possess the necessary technical equipment.
4. International radio stations that transmit via satellite whose coverage exceeds the 
Lebanese territory.
Chapter Four:
Setting up the station
Artic le Twelve:
The TV  or radio station is established in the form o f a Lebanese Anonymous Company
that cannot own more than one TV or radio station.
Artic le Thirteen:
A ll the shares in this company have to be nominal and the shareholders have to meet the
follow ing conditions:
The real shareholder has to be a Lebanese citizen legally eligible and not 
convicted of any cnme or violation and not deprived o f his civil rights.
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- The entity shareholder has to be a purely Lebanese company, the internal system 
of which prevents it from passing over these shares to non-Lebanese persons or 
companies.
- It is not allowed for a real person or entity to own directly or indirectly more than 
ten percent o f the total company shares. The husband and wife and all direct 
relatives are to be considered one person or entity.
Article Fourteen:
Founders o f such a company are obliged to own at least thirty five percent o f its capital 
and are not allowed to sell their shares for five years from the date o f issuing the license.
The company has to publish in the official gazette a list o f all its shareholders with their 
relative shares at the time of issuing the license. In case shares are bought ad sold, the 
company has to republish this list in the same manner.
Article Fifteen:
A ll the shares’ movements in the TV and radio stations are subject to prior licensing. Any 
selling or buying or passing over of shares that is done with no prior licensing is 
considered null or void.
A penalty is imposed on whoever commits an illegal action, o f the sort mentioned above, 
or participates in it, that consists of the value of the shares that were sold or passed over 
and of a ja il sentence from six months to three years, and the confiscation of shares by the 
state, which can sell them according to applied laws.
The rules of this article also apply to actions committed by an intermediary, who is 
considered liable for the fine mentioned above.
Any agreement or contract pertaining to the above mentioned is considered null and void 
and no compensation of any kind ensues.
Chapter Five:
Licensing 
Article Sixteen:
Licenses are granted to the TV  and radio stations in accordance w ith a decree issued by 
the government after consulting the National Council for Audio Visual Media.
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Article Seventeen:
A committee is formed under the name The National Council for Audio Visual Media 
(NCAVM) that comprises ten members appointed jo in tly  and equally by the government 
and parliament.
Article Eighteen:
The members of this committee have to be Lebanese citizens qualified in the fields of 
science, literature, technical specialization and so on, and who are not employed by the 
state or municipalities for any function or in any capacity.
Article Nineteen:
In addition to other functions mentioned previously in this law, the function o f the 
National Council of Audio Visual Media is as follows:
1. The consideration of license applications submitted to the government and 
referred to it by the M inistry o f Information. When necessary, this committee can 
seek the advice of a specialist in the media.
2. Making sure that the legal requirements are met.
3. Submitting recommendations in which they state whether any license application 
should be approved or rejected. This recommendation is published in the officia l 
gazette as soon as the M inister o f Information deposits it in the governmental 
system and before nay decision is made by the government regarding license 
application.
4. The National Council o f Audio Visual Media has to finalize its recommendation 
and present it within forty days from the date it  received the license application.
5. The government through the Minister of Information w ill place the license 
application and all the required documents and technical information at the 
disposal of the National Council o f Audio Visual Media.
Article Twenty:
1. The N C AVM ’s term is three years, renewable.
2. In the event of any membership vacancy, for any reason, a new member w ill be 
appointed in the same manner adopted to appoint the previous member, and 
within one month, for the rest of the term.
3. Any member who fails to attend three consecutive sessions with no valid excuse 
is considered to have resigned.
Article Twenty-One:
Members of NCAVM  are prohibited from engaging in any other business that conflicts 
with the nature o f their work fo r the council.
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Artic le  Twenty-Two:
The N C A V M  legislates its modus operandi and the government approves it.
A rtic le  Twenty-Three:
The members’ compensation schemes are specified by the government.
A rtic le  Twenty-Four:
Any decision issued by the government can be reviewed before the State Jury in case any 
legal licensing law was broken.
A rtic le  Twenty-Five:
A ll the exemplary conditions are to be prepared and listed by one or more specialized 
committees depending on the nature of the subjects. This committee is formed by a 
decree issued by the government, and the committee can seek the advice of specialists 
and technicians of its choice.
This exemplary condition logbook is accredited by a government decree after consulting 
the higher media council.
Artic le  Twenty-Six:
The duration of the license is sixteen years, renewable, provided the station applies three 
years prior to the expired date of the license.
A rtic le  Twenty-Seven:
First: The license fee payable by the TV or radio station is determined as follows:
1. TV  stations of first and second categories: two hundred and fifty  million Lebanese 
Pounds (1$=1,500LP)
2. Radio stations of the first category: one hundred and twenty five million Lebanese 
Pounds.
3. Radio stations of the second category: f if ty  m illion Lebanese Pounds.
Second: the yearly rental fee payable by the TV  and radio stations is determined as 
follows:
1. TV  stations of the first and second categories: one m illion Lebanese Pounds.
2. Radio stations of the first category: twenty m illion Lebanese Pounds.
3. Radio stations of the second category: fifteen m illion Lebanese Pounds.
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Chapter Six:
The management and duties o f stations 
Article Twenty-Eight:
Each television or radio station must appoint a program director. First category stations 
that transmit news bulletins and political programs must appoint a director in charge of 
such programs.
The director has to be a Lebanese citizen for more than ten years, enjoy legal competence, 
not be convicted in any crime or misdemeanor, and ready to work in fu ll time capacity 
for the station.
Article Twenty-Nine:
The TV or radio station must publish in the official gazette, in local newspapers and in 
the commercial register the names of its chairman and board members and has to also 
provide the public with a list o f all shareholders.
Article Thirty.
TV and radio station s have to transmit national orientation programs, educational, health, 
intellectual, and tourist programs at the rate of one hour per week. These programs are to 
be aired free o f charge and according to the request of the M inistry o f Information in the 
air times determined by the conditions logbook. Materials required for transmission are 
either supplied by the M inistry o f Information or from the stations’ archives.
Article Thirty-One:
Any person or entity has the right to defend himself against any allegations transmitted 
by any TV  or radio station.
The station in question has to transmit the defense under the same technical conditions 
that the allegations were transmitted in, and in a fashion that ensures the same audience.
It is up to the M inister o f Information to request transmission o f any correction or 
negation of any news item that has to do with any public interest or administration 
according to the norms specified under the publication law.
The right defense has to be exercised during the specific periods, and according to the 
law, and under the penalties mentioned in the publication laws and their amendments.
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Article Thirty-Two:
The license decree is issued after verifying that the station has abided by the required 
conditions. The station is given a one year period, from the date it is informed by the 
government, to put itself into operation according to the legal conditions, and the 
government can extend this period i f  it deems it necessary, and it loses its rights to obtain 
a license should it fail to request from the Ministry o f Information verification that the 
station has abided by the legal, technical and financial licensing conditions, before the 
one year period.
Article Thirty-Three:
The TV and radio stations bear the legal responsibility that ensues legally from any 
malpractice in its operations.
Chapter Seven:
Restrictions and penalties 
Article Thirty-Four:
The TV and radio stations are obliged to abide by the licensing and legal rules.
Article Thirty-Five:
1. In the event the station does not abide by the requirements of this law and other 
laws, the following procedure is applied.
First violation: Based on the recommendation of the National Council fo r Audio 
Visual Media, the M inister o f Information orders a three-day suspension o f the 
station in question.
Second violation: Based on the Minister of Information’s recommendation, 
originating from the recommendation submitted by the NCAVM, the government 
orders the station in question to halt its transmission for a minimum period of 
three days and a maximum period of one month.
The NCAVM meets under its own initiative or i f  summoned by the M inister of 
Information.
The Minister o f Information can waive the council’ s recommendation should the 
council fail to meet w ith in forty eight hours o f the minister’ s summons.
A ll decisions mentioned under this article are subject to revision before a 
specialized court that studies the case within a period of one year according to the 
applied laws. In the event that the procedure inflicted on the station is not
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constitutional, the station can claim a maximum of up to 10 million Lebanese 
Pounds for every day of non-transmission, and the radio station 3 million LP.
2. In addition to item 1 above, all the penalties mentioned in the general penalties 
law and in the publication law and in this law and others, are applied to the 
violations committed by TV and radio stations. These penalties w ill be applied to 
their maximum as mentioned in article 257 o f the penalties law.
The sentence “ TV and radio stations”  is added wherever needed in the mentioned 
law and transmission is considered equal to publication, which is mentioned in 
article 209 of the penalties law.
Chapter E ight:
Advertisements 
Artic le  Thirty-Six:
T V  and radio stations should refrain from airing any advertisement that might misinform 
the consumer, harm his health or interests, or includes any violation of public morals.
Artic le  Thirty-Seven:
Advertisements should be prepared clearly and easily and in a manner different audio 
visually from the programs during which they are aired. Newscasters are not permitted to 
appear or be heard in an advertisement.
Artic le  Thirty-Eight:
Advertisements are to be aired between each program and can be aired during a program, 
provided that the unity and value of the program are intact, and in a manner not harmful 
to the owners o f the program’s literary and artistic rights.
Artic le  Thirty-Nine:
It  is mandatory that each station establishes or deals w ith a media concessionaire (Regie) 
that solicits advertisements and that manages its advertising affairs.
The advertising management in a TV or radio station and the advertising agencies are not 
permitted to contract their advertisements to one medium exclusively.
It is forbidden for the owners of a TV or radio station or their Regie and their spouses and 
children to have shares in more than one establishment. Also full-time employees in a 
Regie can only serve on TV and one radio station.
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Article Forty:
A ll matters related to the subject of advertisements that are not mentioned in this law are 
to be regulated by a special law.
Chapter Nine:
Tele Liban 
Article Forty-One:
1. The exclusive rights originally granted to Tele-Liban to utilize all T V  channels 
are canceled. Tele Liban is granted the right to transmit on all VHF channels and 
one program on the UHF channels, according to the technical organization that 
would distribute the channels to the licensed stations.
In compensation Tele Liban w ill be exempted from paying the fees applicable to 
other stations until the year 2012 when its exclusivity rights w ill end.
2. Tele Liban has no right thereof for compensation in any kind, w ith the exception 
of the compensation mentioned above.
3. The government has the right to reorganize Tele Liban’s operation by special 
government decrees issued on the basis of recommendations issued by the 
Ministers o f Finance and Information.
Chapter Ten:
Station income audit 
Article Forty-Two:
At the end of every six months, the station has to submit to the M in is try  o f Information as 
statement o f its investment account.
This account includes only the sums and income that originate from  the station’s business 
operations under the legal and technical consensus. The m inistry in question has to audit 
this account and verify  the income form advertisements, production sales and others i f  
necessary, u tiliz ing all available audit methods including auditing the licensed stations 
and advertising agencies’ books.
In the event the station falls under financial deficit that does not exceed three quarters of 
its capital submitted in the previous statement, the Minister o f Inform ation can grant the 
licensed station a period o f six months at the end of which the station should submit its 
investment account. I f  after this period the income did not cover ha lf o f this deficit, the 
Minister o f Information has the right to request the publications court to issue a verdict
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by which the station has to cease transmission for a period decided by the court but no 
exceeding one year.
Should the deficit turn out to exceed three quarters of the stations’ capital, the Minister of 
Information has the right to refer the station to a specialized jurisdiction in  order to 
decide on ceasing transmission immediately and without prior notice, for a period not 
exceeding one year. Financial deficit means the accumulated financial deficit.
Article Forty Three:
After the suspension period expires, the station cannot resume transmission unless it 
proves it has acquired the necessary funds required to cover the whole deficit, in which 
case it has to submit the source o f funds and the method by which they were acquired.
The Minister of Information can request more clarification and evidence and 
consequently make a decision to allow the station to resume transmission in light of that 
evidence and statements submitted by the station, clarifying the sources o f the funds and 
their authenticity, and after ensuring that the station was not engaged in any action that 
could conflict with public interests.
Article Forty-Four:
Any violator of articles 42 and 43 previously mentioned in this law, or to any o f them, is 
penalized by jail sentence varying from three months to one year; and by a fine of ten to 
thirty million LP, or both penalties.
Article Forty-Five:
In the event the station achieved a financial gain that cannot be legally accounted for, the 
Minister of Information can request the publication court to issue an order to cease 
transmission for a penod ranging from three to six months.
The court must also impose a fine on the station in question equivalent in value to double 
the amount unaccounted for financial gain.
In the event that it was proven that this gain was obtained with the intention to serve 
another state, or any foreign or local institution in a manner that conflicts w ith the public 
interests or that touches on the political system or that ignites sectarian conflicts or 
encourages havoc and acts of turmoil, the penalty would be six months to two years ja il 
sentence and a fine ranging from 50 to 100 m illion LP.
The court can rule that the station ceases transmission for a period ranging from six 
months to two years and can also rule to cancel the license issued for this station 
indefinitely.
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Article Forty-Six:
The mechanism by which the station audit is carried on is determined by a decree issued 
by the government based on the Minister of Information's recommendation.
Chapter Eleven:
Censorship on TV and Radio stations 
Article Forty-Seven:
By request o f the Ministry of Information, the National Council for Audio Visual Media 
practices censorship over TV and radio stations.
Chapter Twelve:
Article Forty-Eight:
A ll the rulings of the law of commerce that do not conflict with the rulings of this law are 
applied.
Article Forty-Nine:
I f  necessary, the details required in the application of this law are specified by 
government decrees based on recommendations submitted by relevant ministers.
Article Fifty:
TV  and radio stations are granted a period of two months prior to putting this law into 
effect to present license applications after the M inistry o f Information announces that it is 
receiving them. The government can grant additional extensions to complete the 
application file.
These stations remain operational until the license decree is issued and resume their 
operation accordingly thereof, or are given a period of time to liquidate their assets in 
case their application were rejected.
Article Fifty-One:
A ll the TV and radio stations are exempted from fines, taxes, and fees of any kind before 
this law came into force.
Article Fifty-Two:
A ll the previous legislation that contradicts or conflicts with this law is canceled.
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Article Fifty-Three:
This law becomes effective immediately after its publication in the official gazette.
Source: The National Council for Audio Visual Media (Kraidy, Marwan, Trans.)
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Appendix B
Satellite Broadcast Amendments 
1996
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Chapter One:
This law specifies:
1. The rental process or transmitters and airwaves through satellites dishes and 
terrestrial stations owned by the M in istry o f Telecommunications.
2. The fees that such rental incurs.
Chapter Two:
Renting equipment for satellite transmission is approved through recommendation of the 
Minister o f Telecommunications, according to guidelines set by the ministry and by this 
law.
Licensing falls under the jurisdiction of laws 233, 234, 235, and 250 of decree number 
126 dated 6/12/1959.
Chapter Three:
The licensing application should be submitted to the Minister of Telecommunications in 
three copies, and the Minister then asks for the counsel o f the Minister of Information in 
decision-making, for a duration that does not exceed 15 days.
The application should include the following:
1. Name and address of the station to be licensed.
2. Name and address of the person responsible for broadcasting.
3. Technical study that delineates the source of transmission and clarifies the 
equipment’ s technical description to be linked to the terrestrial station, as well as 
the technical means of transmission.
Commitment
4. The station commits to follow the laws and not to transm it:
a. Political news, directly or indirectly, unless it is licensed to do so through 
a decision made in the M inisters’ Cabinet following the recommendation 
of the Minister of Information.
b. Programs that might endanger public safety and national security, or that 
would affect the nation's relations with Arabic or Foreign friendly 
countries, or programs that would endanger these countries’ national 
security.
c. Pornographic programs.
d. Programs that might instigate confessional conflicts or that would insult a 
certain religion.
e. Anything that might promote a relationship with the Zionist enemy.
f. Any programs without permission by its owner(s).
g. The Institution should get an approval from the Minister of Information 
before airing its programs.
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h. The Institution should put a bank deposit that is unconditional (200 
m illion LP) to pay for any violation of the laws, especially law 382/94, 
and should make sure the amount stays the same after each fine, under the 
risk of having its license revoked.
The Minister o f Information is responsible for implementing the clauses mentioned above, 
and in case o f violation the Minister’ s Cabinet, following a recommendation from the 
Minister o f Information, can suspend transmission for a month at the most and without 
compensation.
Chapter Four:
The Court Jurisdiction
The Ministers’ Cabinet, following the recommendation of the M inister o f Information 
and Foreign A ffa irs Minister, can ask for the court’ s decision in a matter o f violation, and 
the channel can have its license revoked without any compensation except for the license 
fee of the duration of time it was stopped.
License can be revoked in case of any violation, including laws number 126 and 127 or 
1959.
Chapter Five:
The station should provide:
1. The Microwave equipment needed to link its satellite station with its 
terrestrial counterpart.
2. The necessary equipment needed for the UP L ink  and the DOWN Link to 
receive and transmit airwaves through the terrestrial stations.
The following guidelines should be followed:
a. The conditions put forth by the Ministry o f Telecommunications
b. The conditions put forth by the International Counseling Committee for 
Telegraphs and Telephones. (CCITT) and the International Counseling 
Committee for Telecommunications (CCIR)
c. That its transmission does not affect other communications on the airwaves.
d. That the institution provides maintenance for its equipment continuously.
Chapter Six:
Rental Duration
1. Rental lasts three years, and transmission can go up to 24 hours daily, but no 
less than 12 hours daily.
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2. The Ministry of Telecommunications may rent the airwaves for a duration that 
is less than three years, especially for international news agencies.
The rental conditions and fees are decided by the Ministry of Telecommunications.
Chapter Seven:
Rental process
Fees are due every beginning o f the year and every rented year is 12 months, w ith 30 day 
months.
Chapter Eight:
Rental Fees
1. Application Fee: 1 M illion  LP (Due when applying)
2. Founding Fee: 400,000 LP (Due when signing the contract with the 
government)
3. Monthly Channel Fee: 1st channel: 75,000 LP; 2nd channel: 50,000 LP; all 
other channels: 40,000 LP. D igital channel fees are doubled.
4. Yearly fess: 60,000 LP for each channel.
5. Yearly equipment fees: 5,000 LP
Chapter Nine:
The fees are paid in Lebanese Pound.
Chapter Ten:
A ll laws that contradict this law are cancelled, except for law 382/94 
This law does not include encrypted television transmission.
Chapter Eleven:
The implementation of this law is undertaken in the Minister’s cabinet through offic ia l 
decrees.
Chapter Twelve:
This law becomes effective immediately after its publication in the officia l gazette.
Source: The National Council fo r Audio Visual Media (Youssef, Yara, Trans.)
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